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Abstract 
The study analyses the incentives and mechanisms of failing firms on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange that restructure their claims following a decline in 
performance and value. The study also analyses patterns for restructuring of failing 
firms. The sample contains firms that were delisted between 1986 and 1996. Firms 
that were delisted and re-instated number 28 and constitute the sample for firms that 
restructured successfully their claims. Firms that were delisted on the JSE following 
an unsuccessful debt restructuring number 32 and constitute the sample for 
unsuccessful firms. 
The study finds that firms that restructured successfully on the JSE have more 
intangible assets, less bank debt and few creditors. This finding means that South 
African corporate restructuring activities relies more on assets characteristics rather 
than financial characteristics. 
Analysis of patterns for restructuring reveals that successful firms are smaller by size, 
and experienced a substantial decline in cash flow performance and liquidity. 
Successful firms have a higher market book ratio and present a high level of short-
term debt maturity. Analysis of ownership change on the oriset of financial failure 
reveals that unsuccessful firms experienced a substantial decline in minority interests 
ownership. The decline in minority interests reveals that the market can recognize 
firm with substantial going concern value. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
Chapter 1 General Introduction I 
I.I.Background to problem. 
The modem theory of finance defines a firm as a nexus of an interrelated set of 
contracts among various interested parties: shareholders, managers, bondholders, and 
other stakeholders which include customers, suppliers, employees and society at large. 
It is a legal fiction within which conflicting objectives of these disparate individuals 
are brought into equilibrium so that the firm can make decisions to maximise their 
welfare. Although these stakeholders have a common interest in the firm's success, 
the modem theory of finance recognises that financial contracts are incomplete and 
may fail to constrain future decisions. This has led to the analysis of the allocation of 
control and decision rights across these different classes of claimholders in the firm. 
Financial contracts among claimholders are designed for the firm to implement 
optimal financial and investment decisions. However, the separation of ownership and 
control in modem organisations can lead to sub-optimal decision making, primarily 
for two reasons: First, the assignment of control rights to a class of investors who 
enjoy the right to make decisions concerning investment and the distribution of cash 
flow results in sub-optimal decision making because the controlling party has an 
incentive to invest inefficiently, and is permitted . to do so. This is because 
management, acting- in the stockholders' interest, has incentives to design the firm's 
operating characteristics and financial structure in ways which benefit a specific class 
of stockholders. Second, the controlling party assumes control because non 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
controlling parties are passive and fail to monitor the actions of the controlling party 
and enforce wealth maximisation policies. 
Tue effects of the structure of implicit and explicit ownership claims on the 
investment and financing decisions of the controlling party are not often a problem for 
a company as a going concern. Adverse effects of these claims are evident only when 
a firm is experiencing poor performance and a decline in value. There are adverse 
effects on a firm ' s value as a result of leverage in bringing the going concern value 
closer to liquidation value. In this case, the firm runs the risk of defaulting on 
contractual explicit claims of debtholders. 
Legislation on ownership contracts specifies how resources are to be allocated 
between investors and a firm as a going concern. This is not the case when a firm 
breaches its contractual promises to claimholders. If leverage can produce such effects 
on the firm 's value,· why do firms borrow? The most obvious reason for seeking a 
combination of alternative sources of finance is to increase the availability of funds. In 
addition, a firm can achieve higher returns for shareholders by borrowing. 
There are competing views on how leverage affects the economic activity of the firm 
and its value. Tue first view, implicit in the theory on leverage, argues that, in 
borrowing, a firm improves economic performance and prevents corporate waste. It is 
argued that the more debt in the capital structure, the lower the corporate tax liability, 
the higher the after -tax cash flow, and the greater the market value of the firm 
[Modigliani and Miller (1958)]. This is the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theory 
on capital structure. Tue irrelevance theory suggests that, in the absence of bankruptcy 
2 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
costs and tax subsidies on interest, the value of the firm is independent of its financial 
structure. The theory is based on the assumption that the probability distribution of 
future cash flow to the firm is independent of the structure of its capital whether 
financed by debt or equity. Further, the irrelevance theory implies that a firm can be 
entirely financed with debt. 
The principle of leverage relies on the fact that the firm achieves a return on assets 
which is greater than the cost of finance to long-term lenders of funds . Debt providers 
do not share in the profits but receive contractual payments and interest only. Any 
returns that can be generated above the contractual payment and interest accrue to the 
shareholders. Shareholders are entitled to unlimited claims on the firm's assets and 
operating income of the firm after creditors ' claims have been met. This is consistent 
with the risk/return notion that a high expected return is always accompanied by a 
higher risk. Equity providers give lenders the first claims on the firm 's assets and 
operating income. In return for bearing more risk per rand invested, they earn a higher 
return per rand invested. Lenders accept a lower return per rand invested because they 
have a safer claim on the firm 's assets. 
The principle of leverage and the risk/return notion cannot alter the behaviour of 
management and securityholders for two reasons: 
i) The theory presupposes that there is a uriique optimal set of financial contracts 
which maximises the value of the firm and that there are benefits associated with the 
inclusion of risky debt in the capital structure. It assumes that the inclusion of risky 
debt induces management to maximise the value of the firm rather than maximising 
the value of equity. 
3 
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Chapter I General Introduction 
ii) As a consequence of (i), financial contracts between management and claimholders 
can be written without cost and enforced. This is because external market forces and 
the possibility of restructuring the firm's claims provide an efficient incentive for 
managers to follow a firm value-maximising policy. 
The second reason, based on theories on leverage that argue that firms balance the tax 
advantage of debt and the greater cost of financial distress, is that large debt burdens 
constrain investment and threaten the financial stability of firms. High leverage 
increases the probability of occurrence of liquidation of a firm's assets when it cannot 
meet its contractual obligations to debtholders and the firm's constituencies. It also 
raises concern about what happens to these failing firms and on the structure of 
different claims. 
On the one hand, H~ugen and Senbet (1978) and Jensen (1989b) argue that as long as 
a firm has good prospects, financial failure will have no real impact on the firm's 
value. This is a version of the Coase theorem (1960), which implies that in a 
frictionless world there are no economic costs imposed by the threat of bankruptcy. If 
the firm as a going concern can be made profitable by changing its capital structure, 
efficient recontracting would result in a restructuring of financial claims to maximise 
the firm's value. Indeed, if there were costs to transferring ownership rights, they 
could be eliminated by selling new shares in. the firm and using the proceeds to pay 
impaired creditors. From an efficiency standpoint, financial failure does not matter 
because the value created by leverage does not come; necessarily, at the price of an 
increased probability of corporate failure. A more efficiently run firm can carry a 
higher debt burden with an equal or reduced probability of failure. The argument put 
4 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
forward is that leverage has no real impact on the firm's value because, as long as the 
firm has good investment opportunities, the ownership claims can be repackaged to 
assure its survival. 
The above view suggests that the operating value of the firm can be preserved by 
privately resolving conflicts among claimholders rather than filing for bankruptcy or 
liquidation. On the other hand, another argument suggests that conflicting interests of 
claimholders may induce management to maximise the value of a particular set of 
security holders rather than maximising firm value. The management bias can make 
financial recontracting difficult and may motivate debtholders to liquidate the firm 
even though it is collectively inefficient for them to do so. 
These arguments are based on the theory of the agency costs of debt. The theory 
suggests that the choice of capital structure of a firm affects the incentives of 
individuals, that is, individuals whose decisions determine the allocation of both the 
income stream and control rights over securities. It presupposes the existence of 
conflicts of interests between the different classes of claimants to the firm's cash 
flow. If the allocation of rights belongs only to one set of security holders of the 
firm's assets, then the investment and financing policies of the firm may maximise 
the value of one set of securities and not maximise the value of the firm. 
The implication is that, in case of default, there is a bias favouring liquidation unless 
the value that can be pledged to impaired non-active and outside security holders 
exceeds the liquidation value. In that case there will be efficient restructuring. 
5 
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Tue restructuring of financial claims often creates value for all classes of security 
holders of the firm 's assets. This reorganisation probably would have created value 
before a firm entered a state of financial default, but the impetus for changes 
provided by the presence of risky debt may be absent in the capital structure. 
Leverage in this case acts as a catalyst in creating an illusion of financial failure, and 
thus precipitates painful but necessary changes [Stewart (1990) ]. The changes that 
occur after financial failure are unlikely to occur in all equity firms. This is because 
without leverage i:md poor performance, a decline in a firm's value does not 
necessarily lead to corporate failure. 
Similarly, Gilson (1990) finds that the possibility that corporate failure could result in 
beneficial outcomes was generally ignored in finance. New empirical evidence 
[Brealey and Myers (1996), Jensen (1986), Kaplan (1989b), Smith (1990), Baker and 
Wruck (1989), Kaplan and Stein (1990), Titman (1984), Gilson (1989,1990), Altman 
(1984), Weiss (1990), Gilson, John and Lang (1990) and Cutler and Summers 
(1988)] demonstrates that financial failure has both benefits and costs, and that 
financial and ownership structures affect the net cost of failure. Financial failure is 
often accompanied by changes in management, governance and structure. Tue 
objective of such organisational change is to create value by improving the use of 
resources through a workout or liquidation · process, or under the supervision of a 
bankruptcy court. 
6 
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Wruck (1990) finds that corporations facing failure experience a variety of situations 
which affect the value of claims of different classes of security holders. These 
situations raise a question of agency relationship between shareholders, managers and 
creditors. The questions that arise here are whether a levered firm facing failure 
stemming from poor performance or decrease in value can be restored and a positive 
going concern value· be re-established, or will liquidation value result in a high value 
for the firm's claimholders? Can the interests of the central parties (shareholders, 
managers, creditors and other activities stakeholders) be balanced? What are the 
effects on the going ·concern value and claims of the different parties in a firm? What 
are the incentives of stockholders, bondholders and managers to accept a bankruptcy, 
reorganisation or liquidation of firm's assets? 
1.2. Research and problem. 
The ability of failing firms to respond to a decline in performance and the incentives 
of failing firms to accept a liquidation or restructuring process are important factors 
that affect their organisational efficiency. The present study is based on the suggestion 
of Jensen (1989) that private contractual arrangements for resolving financial failure 
represent a viable and less costly alternative to liquidation. The objective is to analyse 
the nature of corporate reorganisation activities during poor performance for a sample 
of South African listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. It also 
investigates the mechanisms that allow companies delisted from the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange to be re-instated on the stock market. 
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Chapter I General Introduction 
The study is motivat.ed by the different contractual relationships that characterise most 
South African firms . Berger and Ofek (l 996b) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) 
argue that firms implementing corporate refocusing programs often do so in the 
presence of external control pressure such as takeover attempts and block share 
repurchase. Little evidence exists on restructuring mechanisms in South Africa where 
joint ownership of debt and equity by holding companies is supposed to result in 
stringent managerial monitoring and create incentives to value-maximising decisions, 
as suggested by Jensen (1989a,b). 
This study uses a combination of definitions for financial failure. Gilson (1990) 
defines failure as the inability to pay debts as they fall due, entrance into bankruptcy 
proceedings or an explicit agreement to reduce debts. Extending this definition, 
Altman (1983) def~es failure as each situation where the realised rate of return on 
invested capital, with allowances for risk considerations, is significantly and 
continually lower than the prevailing rates on similar investments. In this situation, 
failure is not synonymous with discontinuance of productive operations. It should be 
noted that a company can be an economic failure for many years yet never fail to meet 
its current obligations. 
1.3. Objectives of research. 
The objectives of the research presented here were to: 
1. Identify different mechanisms to resolve corporate failure at the J.S.E, 
2. Analyse patterns for reorganisation. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
1.4. Organisation of thesis. 
The thesis is organised as follows. The second chapter discusses the impediments to 
financial recontracting and incentive effects among the different classes of firm's 
claimholders. The third chapter presents the development of the hypothesis and the 
methodology for financial recontracting in a South African environment. The fourth 
chapter discusses the mechanisms and incentives of corporate failure resolution on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The following chapters consider the patterns for 
reorganisation of failing firms. The fifth chapter analyses sample characteristics by 
size, cash flow performance and liquidity and the recontracting period. Chapter six 
discusses leverage characteristics. The seventh chapter assesses the financing of assets 
patterns. The eighth chapter considers the maturity of debt. The ninth chapter assesses 
the ownership structure change on the onset of financial failure. The last chapter 
summarises the argument leading to a general conclusion. 
9 
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Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
Introduction. 
The conflicting incentives of claimholders can create an impediment to financial 
recontracting. Since bondholders have the priority over claims to liquidation proceeds, 
they are more likely than stockholders to choose to liquidate the company even if it is 
inefficient to do so. Moreover, when the debt is diffusely held, informational 
asymmetries can arise between poorly informed outside bondholders and better 
informed managers or insiders of the firm. Bondholders are not likely to be well 
informed about the firm and may not know if it is profitable to provide new capital or 
to give interest and principal concessions. The last impediment to financial 
recontracting is holdout problems, when debt is held by a large number of diffuse 
creditors. The chapter analyses the impediments to financial recontracting by failing 
firms. In section 2.1 the impediments created by the agency costs of debt are analysed, 
while section 2.2 focuses on the problem created by asymmetric information. In 
section 2.3 impediments created by holdout problems are discussed. 
10 
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Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
2.1. Agency costs of debt. 
The agency theory identifies two types of conflicts related to financial policy: the 
manager-shareholder and shareholder-bondholder conflicts. The first area of conflict 
stems from the separation of ownership and control. The manager-entrepreneur who 
does not own a significant fraction of equity in the firm is likely to be more directly 
interested in maximising his own utility than the value of the firm. This creates a 
conflict between the manager-entrepreneur and outside shareholders. The agency cost 
derives from three sources: 
i) The first source of conflict arises from the management' s tendency to consume 
some of the firm resources in the form of various perquisites. As Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) point out, managers have an incentive to expand the size of their firm beyond 
the point at which shareholders' wealth is maximised. Growth increases managers ' 
power and perquisites by increasing the resources at their command. This is because 
changes in managerial compensation are related to sales. Growth also tends to 
increase managerial compensation; 
ii) The second source of conflict arises from the fact that managers have a greater 
incentive to shirk responsibilities as their equity interest falls. They will trade off the 
costs of putting in additional effort against the marginal benefits. With a fixed salary 
and a small equity claim, professional managers are unlikely to devote energy to the 
company equivalent to that put forth by an entrepreneur; 
iii) Finally, risk aversion can cause managers to forego profitable investment 
opportunities. Although the risk of potential loss ·from an investment may be 
diversified in the capital markets, it is more difficult for managers to diversify the 
risks associated with losing their salary and reputation. Foregoing profitable but risky 
11 
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Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
investment amounts to the purchase by management of career insurance at the 
shareholders ' expense. These inefficiencies of the manager-entrepreneur are reduced 
when the fraction of equity owned by the manager is large. Holding constant the 
manager-entrepreneur's absolute investment in the firm, and increases in the fraction 
of the firm financed by debt, increase the manager's share of equity and mitigate the 
loss due to conflicts between the entrepreneur-manager and shareholders. 
The benefit of debt 'in this case is twofold: First, the presence of debt in the capital 
structure increases the riskiness of the firm 's assets. In addition, if failure is costly for 
the manager-entrepreneur, the loss of reputation and the benefits of co trol can create 
an incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites and make better 
investment decisions [Grossman and Hart (1982)]. Second, because the value of 
common stocks equals the market value of the firm (that is, total assets minus the 
value of its liabilities), the manager-entrepreneur, acting in stockholders ' interests, has 
incentives to design the firm 's operating characteristics and financial structure in a 
way which can increase shareholders' wealth by reducing the value of the bonds. 
This possibility is at the root of the stockholder-bondholder conflict. Smith and 
Warner (1979) identify four sources of conflicts that arise from management's 
endogenous policies·on investment, financing and dividends: 
i) Dividend payment: management can increase the dividend rate for stockholders by 
reducing the possibility to finance positive net present value investment. In buying the 
bonds, bondholders assume that the firm will maintain constant its dividend policy. At 
the limit, management can sell all the firm ' s a.Ssets and pay a liquidating dividend to 
stockholders but leave bondholders with a worthless claim. 
12 
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Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
ii) Claim dilution: the claims of the firm ' s bondholders can be reduced when 
management finances new investment by issuing additional debt of the same or higher 
priority than the initial debt. 
iii) Asset substitution: Jensen and Meckling(l 976) find that a high debt level can 
induce management to opt for excessively risky investment projects. The incentive for 
such a move is that limited liability provision in debt contracts implies that risky 
projects will provide higher mean returns to stockholders, zero in low states of nature 
and high in good states. With risky investment, the value of stockholders ' equity rises 
while the bondholder' s claim is reduced by increasing the firm variance rate; 
iv) Underinvestment: Myers (1977) suggests that management can have incentives to 
reject investment with a positive net present value if the benefit from accepting the 
project accrues to bondholders. 
2.1.1. Conflicts between equityholders and manager-entrepreneurs. 
The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has been the 
focus of considerable attention in most literature on agency costs [Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976)]. It is contended that, as management 
holds a bigger stake in the firm's future cash flow, its interests become better aligned 
with those of shareholders. As management's stake increases, its interests may 
become less well aligned for several reasons. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and 
Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) note that managers' increased non-human wealth 
investment in the firm may become so large as to make them increasingly sensitive to 
the potentially undiversifiable, non-systematic risk of the firm. If their human wealth 
is also job-specific this will reinforce managerial risk aversion at high managerial 
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stake holding levels. Williamson (1 987) states that, if managers derive more private 
benefit as their stockholding increases, managers are likely to limit risk to protect their 
benefits in the form of perquisites. 
Ownership of equity also implies votes to protect its position, contrary to the interests 
of shareholders, and to pursue its control over the firm assets even when the value of 
the firm is less than liquidation costs. Thus, management's ' and equityholders' 
interests differ in the continuation of operations when the value of the firm is 
decreasing or is less than its liquidation value. According to Harris and Raviv (1990a) 
and Stultz ( 1990), managers and stockholders may well disagree over the continuation 
of an operation. HruTis and Raviv ( l 990a) point out that managers always want to 
continue the firm ' s current operating decisions, even if liquidation is preferred by 
stockholders. Managers are not only reluctant to liquidate under any circumstance but 
are also unwilling to provide detailed information to stockholders that could result in 
this outcome. 
The increase in costs due to investigation by stockholders can be offset by the 
presence of debt for two reasons. First, debt serves as a disciplining device. This is 
because default allows bondholders the option of forcing the firm into liquidation. A 
large debt level favours the decision to liquidate because it makes failure more likely. 
In the absence of failure, it is assumed that incumbent management will not liquidate 
the firm even if the assets are worth more in their next best alternative use. Moreover, 
debt also generates information that can be used by outside shareholders to evaluate 
major operating decisions including liquidation. 
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According to Stultz (1990), management does not maximise shareholder wealth but 
maximises investme_nt, and wants to invest all available funds even if paying cash is 
better for investors. Management is likely to pursue its objective because shareholders 
are not aware of either cash flow or investment. 
The differences in these models result from their assumptions. Stulz's model assumes 
that managers have no equity ownership in the firm and they receive utility from 
managing a large firm, and as a consequence, have an incentive to increase the size of 
the firm. This incentive leads management to undertake negative net present value 
investments. In the model of Harris and Raviv (1990a), the assertion of control by 
investors through bankruptcy entails cost related to the production of information, 
used in the liquidation decision, about the firm ' s prospects. The costs of debt in 
Stultz' s model is that debt payment may more than exhaust free cash, reducing the 
funds available for profitable investment. The model assumes that managers cannot 
credibly communicate cash flow to shareholders, and the presence of debt in the 
capital structure ensures that managers exploit fully all net present value investment 
opportunities. Debt reduces the free cash flow problem by forcing managers to pay out 
all free cash flow as a dividend. 
Another approach links job-specific skills, asset characteristics and capital structure to 
the benefits of financial leverage and the costs of liquidation. Williamson (1988) 
suggests that assets that are more redeployable should be financed with debt to avoid 
the liquidation of assets at a discount to their going concern value. 
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In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) focus on potential buyers of assets. They argue 
that all assets are not redeployable, since most assets are quite specialised. When firms 
have trouble meeting debt payments and sell assets or are liquidated, the highest 
valuation obtained from potential buyers of these assets is likely to be from other 
firms in the industry. Profitability within the industry and across the economy affects 
the price at which assets can be transferred to their best use. Liquidation costs can be 
high because industry buyers of these assets are likely to be credit-constrained when 
the owners of these assets need to sell them. Worse, assets can be sold to industries 
who do not know how to manage them well. The buyer faces an agency cost of hiring 
specialists to run these assets. Moreover, the buyer fears overpaying because he cannot 
value the assets properly. Therefore assets with illiquid secondary market value will 
be able to support fess debt. This is because, like firm-specific assets, they impose 
greater liquidation costs when a firm defaults. As in Harris and Raviv's model, firms 
with higher liquidation costs and tangible assets, and/or firms with lower liquidation 
investigation costs will have more debt. They will be more likely to default but will 
have higher market values than similar firms with lower liquidation value and/or 
higher investigation costs. However, growth and cyclical assets are considered to be 
poor candidates for debt finance because they have a high probability of a low cash 
flow and a higher probability of default on debt. Even an asset with a reasonable 
chance of default can have a higher debt capacity, that is, if it can be easily sold for 
fundamental value when default occurs. If on the other hand, cyclical and growth 
assets are extremely illiquid, costs of financial failure are large. Financing these assets 
with debt is costly for managers. This cost is, however, not applicable to managers of 
conglomerates that are good candidates for debt finance. 
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This is true for several reasons other than the usual reason that conglomerates tend to 
have a lower cash flow volatility and therefore it is less probable that they will be 
unable to meet their debt repayments. First, a conglomerate in need of cash has the 
option of selling assets in several different industries. This allows the conglomerate 
whose underlying industries are illiquid to avoid selling assets as long as it has 
sufficient assets in l~quid industries. Second, a conglomerate has the option of selling 
its assets off in smaller, more liquid pieces without adversely affecting either the value 
of the divested assets or assets kept in the firm. This argument also applies to firms 
that are not literally conglomerates. All other things being equal, a business consisting 
of a loose affiliation of different parts should have a higher debt capacity. The 
presence of risky debt can mitigate the over-investment problem of managers, because 
debt will provide managers with the discipline of the financial market [Jensen (1986)]. 
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2.1.2 Conflicts between equityholders and bondholders. 
Of the group comprising the firm, the largest and perhaps the most important two are 
the bondholders and the stockholders. Stockholders control the firm and are expected 
to choose investment and financial policies that maximise their own wealth. If 
permitted, they could transfer wealth from bondholders by choosing policies that 
increase the risk of outstanding bonds. However, under the costly contracting 
hypothesis, there is a unique set of financial contracts that maximise the value of the 
firm rather than the value of equity. The sub-optimal decision making occurs because 
the controlling party has an incentive to invest inefficiently and his action is not 
monitored. In an environment of incomplete contracting, contracting parties can 
design their securities to mitigate the incentive problem before it arises, that is, by 
including protective provisions in their debt contracts. Various financial contracting 
methods have been examined for their potential in mitigating the agency problems. 
These methods can be broadly classified into three categories: 
i) Devising ways which allow a firm to eliminate existing debt or neutralise its impact 
prior to undertaking a new project. 
Myers (1977) finds that one way to neutraiise debt is to shorten the maturity of 
outstanding debt. Debt has to mature before an investment option can be exercised to 
avoid sub-optimal investment decision. BorroWing short in itself reduces monitoring 
costs. It does offer continuous and gradual renegotiation in which the firm can in 
principle shift back at any time to all equity financing or to another source of debt 
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capital, thus allowing the firm to maintain a continuous, intimate and flexible 
relationship. This single assumption period in which a firm can undertake a new debt 
enforces identity between the life of the project and the life of the bonds. All options 
are exercised at the same point. Green (1984) finds that deviations from behaviour 
that maximises net present value only occurs when a firm undertakes two projects 
which are discriminated only by their relative risk. 
Smith and Warner (1979) criticise this covenant as not optimal because the 
opportunity set of the firm evolves over time and may not be financed with equity or 
reduced dividend. Instead of reducing the risk incentive problem of stockholders, most 
of the gains go to bondholders. This increases their coverage on debt, and reduces the 
default borne by them. 
Bodie and Taggart (1978) analyse the use of callable debt to mitigate this problem. It 
is in the interest of shareholders to include a call option on debt even if bondholders 
have prior knowledge that the call option will be exercised. It may create an 
extemality to shareholders but if there is a chance to default, bondholders have a 
partial share in the residual value of the assets, hence they participate in any changes 
in its fortune. If the firm makes profitable future investments, only part of the net 
benefit will be captured by shareholders and the rest will accrue to the bondholders. 
Since shareholders are not able to reap the full benefit of additional investment, they 
will wish to invest less than would otherwise be optimal. However, if the bonds are 
callable, shareholders can retire debt at a fixed price arid then negotiate an interest rate 
on new debt that fully reflects the value of the additional investments. The incentives 
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of shareholders to invest are no longer weakened in this case. This is because they are 
in a position to capture its full marginal benefit. 
Why do firms never issue non-callable long-term bonds? The problem of uncertainty 
of future interest rates as the main source of the option's value. According to this line 
of reasoning the refunding decision is essentially a zero sum game in which the 
shareholders gain is the bondholders loss. In an efficient capital market callable and 
non-callable bonds should coexist with the price differential between them reflecting 
the value of the call option. Bodie and Taggart (1978) show that the call option on 
corporate bonds need not be a zero sum game between the bondholders and 
shareholders. If the firm faces future investment opportunities, non-callable debt 
weakens its incentives to invest. Shareholders will not capture the full value of these 
opportunities but an inclusion of call options can restore the proper incentives. Thus 
the firm is allowed to renegotiate its debt at the time it undertakes the investment. 
Even when interest rates are such that bondholders are indifferent between callable 
and non-callable bonds, the firm's growth opportunities may give shareholders a 
definite preference for callable bonds. Furthermore, in an inefficient market the 
shareholders will not be worse off with callable debt. Together these two results 
constitute a strong case for including a call option on long-term corporate bond. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Mikkelson (1978) and Green (1984) discuss the use of 
convertible debt. It is an inexpensive way for the insider with both equity and debt to 
eliminate a large part of the risk incentive problem borne by debt. Convertible debt is 
capable of neutralising the conflicts between stockholders and bondholders by giving 
the bondholders an equity claim. This reduces the incentives for the firm to take on 
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unprofitable, high variance-increasing projects. With convertible debt, risk-increasing 
activities increase the value of the conversion option, and thus reduce the gains to 
stockholders from taking high risk projects by transferring part of the gains to 
convertible bondholders. 
ii) Designing ex-ante debt contracts to mitigate the agency cost of debt. 
A common characteristic of these ex-ante contracts is that they specify the relative 
seniority of the claims of existing debtholders vis-a-vis present and future security 
holders. The seniority rules change when there is informational asymmetry between 
stockholders and bondholders such that only stockholders know the true value of the 
new project at the time of financing. If this perceived risk is sufficiently large (small), 
it is optimal to allow all new debt to be subordinated (senior) to the existing debt. 
Otherwise, the optimal rule is to give new debtholders sufficient seniority to equate 
their expected cash flow in the same state. This solution is analogous to project 
financing in that it obtains the maximum separation between claims on the new 
project and those on existing assets within the constraints imposed by informational 
asymmetry. An implication of the above results is that an important determinant of the 
ex-ante seniority rule is the collateral value of the new project. If the expected cash 
flow from a project's dependence on default is low, then it is optimal to make new 
debt strictly subordinate. If the expected ca5h flow is sufficiently large, then it is 
optimal to retain the·option to issue non-subordinated debt. Seniority rules are capable 
of reducing the underinvestment incentives without exacerbating over-investment. 
The seniority rule also alleviates the under-investment problem, while minimising the 
over-investment pro6lem. This is because project financing separates a new project as 
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much as possible fi:om the existing assets without making the new project into a 
separate and independent firm. It is only possible with symmetric information that an 
optimal seniority rule can issue debt through project financing, with the new 
debtholders being given first claim on a new project, but without recourse to existing 
assets. 
Another way in which ex ante debt contracts have been suggested to reduce the 
agency problem is collateralization of assets, which makes it difficult for shareholders 
to substitute low risk projects with high risk projects [Smith and Warner (1970)]. One 
reason to restrict the sale of the substantial units of the firm 's assets is that the 
proceeds of assets sold piecemeal will be less than if sold as a going concern. It makes 
asset substitution expensive to stockholders by requiring that a fraction of the 
proceeds from the sale of assets be used for the retirement of the firm ' s debt. 
Kalay (1982) suggests that a limitation of dividend payment has the potential to cause 
a wealth transfer. Thus both debt and investment-financed dividends can be limited. 
This allows unlimited amounts of dividend payment that are financed by new issues of 
equity and the possibility of restricting the stockholders' legal ability of dividend 
payment. 
Smith and Warner (1979) consider the use of secured debt and leasing to alleviate the 
underinvestment problem. This alleviates conflicts of interests between corporate 
fixed and residual clairnholders. They argue that a long-term non-callable lease 
commits the firm to use a particular set of assets over the life of the lease and then 
control the asset substitution problem. However, the legal standing of leases implies 
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that their use reduces the coverage on standing fixed claims. These claims induce 
corporates to limit leasing activities through provisions in corporate bond contracts. 
In addition, Stultz and Johnson (1985) and Smith and Wakeman (1984) argue that the 
option to enter a long-term non-cancellable lease also affects the incentives problem. 
They suggest that this option limits the under-investment problem by allowing the 
firm to acquire a new project and segregating the claim on the project's cash flow. 
Thus, some assets are acquired through long-term leases. If the project is financed 
with secured debt, but not with unsecured debt, the project' s payoffs would accrue as 
a windfall to owners of previously unsecured debt. 
While a long-term lease is similar to secured debt in a number of ways, it differs in 
others. If the value of a pledged asset in bankruptcy is less than the firm value of the 
associated secured debt claim, the secured creditors also have an unsecured claim on 
the firm ' s other assets for the remainder. The lessor's claims on the firm ' s other asset 
is limited to one 's year lease payments. In a lease, the lessors retain title to the asset 
only as long as there is no default on the lease payments. Should the lessee default, it 
is simpler for a lessor to regain physical possession of a leased asset either prior to or 
after the declaration of bankruptcy than for a secured creditor to acquire the pledged 
assets. 
Ang and Peterson (1984) have examined the trade off between leasing and debt and 
have found that the use of leases and debt is complementary in that firms that issue 
more debt tend to engage in more leasing. This result should not be surprising. 
Although leases and debts are substitutes, for a given firm, the characteristics of 
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investment opportunity sets that provide high debt capacity also tend to provide more 
profitable leasing opportunities. 
John and Nachman (1985) focus on the reputation of investment incentives for firms 
with risky debt when it is common knowledge that the firm has to return to the debt 
market for further financing. The investment decision is modelled as private action on 
the part of insiders because outside claimants would find it costly to monitor the 
investment policy. In such an environment, it is well known that there will be 
underinvestment. The insiders' current investment policy is influenced by the quality 
of the investment opportunities they will have in the future. Firms expecting better 
investment opportunities optimally curtail the degree of underinvestment, moving 
closer towards the pareto optimal levels in anticipation of higher pricing of their 
bonds in the debt market. The bond market would find it rational to price the new 
issue of bonds conditionally on the past investment policy of the firms. Firms with 
better investment and repayment records gain in maintaining reputation and higher 
pricing of their bonds. The repayment behaviour, as well as the amount borrowed, 
conveys information to the bond market. The equilibrium here is also characterised by 
reputation effects on underinvestment incentives leading to reduced agency costs. The 
higher the ratings of bonds the better the investment and repayment records and the 
lower the amount borrowed. In addition, reputation can alleviate the asset substitution 
effects, that is, the incentives of levered equityholders to choose risky, negative net 
present value investments. 
Diamond ( 1989) and Hirschleifer and Thakor ( 1989) show how managers or firms 
have incentives to pursue relatively safe projects to protect their reputations. 
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Diamond's model is concerned with a firm's reputation for choosing projects that 
assure debt repayment. There are two possible investment projects: a safe positive net 
present value project and a risky negative net present value project. The risky project 
can have one of two payoffs, success or failure. Both projects require the same initial 
investment that might be financed by debt. Three scenarios are possible: One type has 
access only to the safe project, one type has access to the risky project, and one type 
has access to both. Since investors cannot distinguish firms ex-ante, the initial lending 
rate reflects their beliefs about the project chosen by firms on average. Returns from 
safe projects suffice to pay the debtholders (even if the firm is believed by investors to 
have only the risky .projects). However, returns from risky projects allow repayment 
only ifthe project is successful; this is because of the asset substitution problem, if the 
firm has a choice of projects. Myopic maximisation of equity value would lead the 
firm to choose the risky projects. If the firm can convince lenders that it only has safe 
projects, it will enjoy a lower lending rate. Since lenders can observe only a firm ' s 
default history, it is possible for a firm to build a reputation for having safe projects by 
not defaulting. The longer the firm's history of repaying its debt, the better its 
reputation, and the lower its borrowing cost. Therefore, more established older firms 
find it optimal to choose the safe projects, and not engage in asset substitution, to 
avoid losing a valuable reputation. Young firms with little reputation may choose 
risky projects. If they survive without a default they will eventually switch to safe 
projects. As a result, firms with a long track record will have lower default rates and 
lower cost of debt than firms with brief histories. 
Although, the amount of debt is fixed in Diamond' s model, it is plausible that an 
extension of the mo.del would yield the result that younger firms have less debt than 
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older ones, ceteris paribus. Managers may also have an incentive to pursue relatively 
safe projects out of a concern for their reputation. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) 
consider a manager who has a choice of two projects, each with only two outcomes -
success or failure. Failure means the same for both projects, but from the point of 
view of shareholders, the high risk return project yields both higher expected returns 
and higher returns if it succeeds. If it is supposed that from the managers' point of 
view success of the two projects is equivalent, the managerial labour market can only 
distinguish between .success and failure. Thus the manager maximises the probability 
of success while shareholders prefer expected return. If the safer project has a higher 
probability of success, the manager will choose it even if the other project is better for 
equity holders. This behaviour of managers reduces the agency cost of debt. Thus, if 
managers are susceptible to such a reputation effect, the firm may be expected to have 
more debt than otherwise. 
Hirshleifer and Thaker (1989) argue that such managers are more likely to be targets 
of a takeover and more susceptible to the reputation effect. These firms are expected 
to have more debt, ceteris paribus. Conversely, firms that have adopted anti-take-over 
measures will use less debt, ceteris paribus. 
iii) Renegotiation of prior contract to resolve conflicts between different security 
holders. 
Some models consider renegotiation as a bargaining game between bondholders and 
stockholders. Bernado and Talley (1996) analyse the possibility for management, 
acting strategically on behalf of shareholders, to select inefficient investment projects 
to enhance their bargaining positions vis-a-vis bondholders. Holding the upside 
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potential of an investment project fixed, managers/shareholders prefer projects with 
lower payoffs in states of failure. This induces individual bondholders to accept 
poorer terms in financial recontracting, thus generating a greater residual for 
shareholders in states of solvency. 
Bergman and Callen ( 1990) consider a stockholders' -oriented management as one 
which credibly threatens to run down firm assets to force concessions from creditors. 
As long as the potential loss is small for managers, threats can be communicated and 
bondholders can accede to reasonable demand. 
Diamond (1993) considers competition among short and long-term bondholders. 
Short-term lenders h~ve an advantage over long term lenders in renegotiation. This is 
because if short-term lenders are not fully paid, they can choose to liquidate the firm. 
It is in the interests of long-term lenders t  accept their conditions because the claims 
can be diluted without their consent. Therefore firms should not provide senior debt to 
any class of bondholders if competitive access to refinancing is available. 
Myers ( 1977) suggests that because of the difficulty of writing and enforcing contracts 
which require firm value maximising decisions, claimholders can either solve the 
problems ex-ante qr ex-post. If creditors and shareholders find themselves in a 
position where the net present value of an investment project is positive but less than 
the payment promised to creditors, then it . is in the interests of both sides to 
renegotiate the debt contract. Renegotiation may lead to an arrangement in which 
creditors accept less than the face amount of their securities in exchange or the 
owners' commitment to put up funds for further investment. The arrangement may 
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call for either party to buy out the other, or find for a third party to buy out the first 
two. 
Similarly, Haugen and Senbet (1978, 1988) argue that in the light of market 
impediments to informal reorganisation, the inclusion of provisions in corporate 
charter and bond indentures could resolve financial failure costlessly. The informal 
reorganisation of capital structure can be accomplished in a number of different ways. 
The stockholders can repurchase the debt at its existing market value. Alternatively, 
the bondholders can purchase the stock. Finally outsiders can purchase both the debt 
and equity at the total market value. The costs of these private mechanisms are small 
and should form an upper limit on the costs of managing corporate failure. Jensen 
(1989, 1991 ) has also argued that since such private restructuring represents an 
alternative to formal bankruptcy proceedings, it pays to privatise bankruptcy if this 
informal mechanism .is cost-efficient. 
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2.2. Asymmetric information. 
A significant portion of the theory on asymmetric information in corporate finance can 
be categorised into two distinct paradigms, agency model and financial signalling 
models. In the agency model, the focus is on the structure of claims on corporate 
assets and the resulting conflicting interests. Moral hazard and incomplete contracting 
ability lie at the centre of the agency relationship. Monitoring costs and widely 
dispersed securities· prevent outside claimants from observing completely some 
actions of corporate insiders: for example, the consumption of perquisites and 
investment risk choices. Financial signalling models, on the other hand, deal with 
asymmetric information between corporate insiders and the outsiders in the market. 
They deal with crucial aspects of the cash flow generating process at the time of 
financing. Since outsiders need such information to compute the true value of their 
external claims, insiders may try to convey signals about the quality of their firm 
through appropriate observabl  corporate actions. 
It is impossible for outsiders to know managerial preferences, attitudes to risk and 
wealth effects of their decisions. Through capital structure choices they expect that 
firms of certain quality are associated with certain types of corporate financing. · 
According to the asymmetric information hypothesis, changes in financial leverage 
convey management's expectations about the firm's prospects. It assumes that 
managers and insiders possess superior information relative to investors about the 
intrinsic value of the firm. These models suggest that changes in the firm's capital 
structure are valid signals that allow managers to convey the inside information to 
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investors. Leland and Pyle ( 1977) consider the fractional ownership of a firm retained 
by a manager-entrepreneur as a signal of firm quality. If the manager-entrepreneur's 
fraction of ownership increases, the value of the firm correspondingly increases, and if 
the level of ownership is sufficiently great, the managerial ownership increases are 
associated with debt. This result establishes a link between firm value and leverage. 
That is why capital structure is used as a signalling device. 
Financial leverage conveys management expectations about the firm's prospects. 
Naranayan (1988) finds that the use of debt perfectly distinguishes among firms of 
different quality in driving firms of inferior quality out of the market. It claims that 
debt, even risky, is more advantageous than outside equity because issuance of debt is 
less attractive to inferior firms . The use of debt as a barrier to entry in the market 
improves the average quality of the firms in the market, thus benefiting every market 
participant even when perfect discrimination is impossible. Debt financing can only 
be used by management if they perceive that the firm is undervalued. They will use 
equity if they perceive it is overvalued. 
Another model using debt to discriminate entry to the market is that of Poitevin 
( 1989), which involves potential competition between an incumbent firm and an 
entrant. At equilibrium low-cost entrants signal this fact by issuing debt while the . 
incumbent and high~cost entrants issue only equity. The cost to a firm of issuing debt 
is that it makes the firm vulnerable to predation· by another firm, which may result in 
bankruptcy of the debt-financed firm. The benefit of debt is that the financial market 
places a higher value on the debt-financed firm, because it believes such a firm to be 
low-cost. High-cost entrants will not issue debt since the resulting probability of 
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bankruptcy due to predation by the incumbent firms renders the cost of misleading the 
capital markets too high. The main result is that issuance of debt is good news to the 
financial market. Since predation is used only to drive one's rival into bankruptcy, 
there will be predation against debt- financed firms. 
Debt is not the only signal to systematic risk in an industry, but managerial risk 
aversion also plays a significant role as a signalling device. This is consistent with 
Blazenko (1987), who finds that, with symmetric information, managers always use 
equity. The aversion of managers to debt results in their avoiding debt financing. The 
use of debt increases the total risk of share ownership. If managers' compensation is 
in part tied to equity performance and if managers are risk-averse, they prefer equity 
over the financial risk associated with debt. If managers know more about asset 
quality than investors, they signal high-quality firms with debt. Managers of low-
quality firms have no incentive to misrepresent their firm by using debt since 
misrepresentation of the intrinsic value creates excessive risk. 
The information asymmetry hypothesis is also affected by management's payoff. Ross 
( 1977) suggests that the manager of a firm whose wages depend on current and future 
values of the firm will use debt to signal the quality of the firm. The dependence of 
the wage on the current value of the firm gives him the incentive to signal, while a . 
penalty in the case of default dissuades him froin overstating the value. 
If the firm has a high quality project, management can increase its wealth by 
signalling with debt financing. Investors will interpret this action as implying a high 
quality project because they realise that management uses debt financing if the 
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probability of default is small. Thus, in Ross ' s model, firm value, debt level and 
bankruptcy probability are all positively related. This is because the increase in default 
penalty incites managers to decrease the debt level and the probability of bankruptcy. 
In case of default, debt can serve as a disciplining device that allows bondholders the 
option to liquidate the firm and discipline management, and provides information 
useful for this purpose. In the model of Harris and Raviv (1991 ), the presence of debt 
in the capital structure generates information that can be used by investors to evaluate 
major operating decisions including liquidation. The informational consequences of 
debt are twofold. First, the ability of the firm to make its contractual payments to debt 
holders provides information. The market place interprets repayment behaviour as a 
signal about the firm ' s value and managerial re utation. Second, in default 
management must placate creditors to avoid liquidation, either through informal 
renegotiations or through formal bankruptcy. Creditors will use information about the 
firm 's prospects to decide whether to liquidate the firm or continue current operations. 
It is contended that management is reluctant to liquidate the firm under any 
circumstance and is unwilling to provide detailed information to creditors that could 
result in such outcomes. Consequently, creditors will use debt to generate information 
about the intrinsic value_ of the firm. They will do so because their legal rights entitle 
them to force management to provide information and to implement the efficient 
liquidation decision. 
For bondholders the necessity to implement an efficient liquidation decision involves 
costly investigation costs. This is because stockholders would not voluntarily liquidate 
the firm even if the liquidation value exceeds the going concern value. As discussed 
by Wruck (1990), when liquidation is the highest valued alternative, failing firms have 
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the incentive to overstate their value to induce bondholders to accept a restructuring 
and thereby preserve some option value for shareholders. The potential wealth transfer 
from bondholders associated with an overstatement of firm value will be greater when 
bondholders receive equity [Brown, James and Mooradian (1993)]. These authors 
show how the information problem can be resolved through the choice of securities 
offered in a debt restructuring. 
When public debt holders are poorly informed about a firm's value, the firm can 
credibly convey information through the choice of securities offered to debtholders. 
The firm has an incentive to convey negative private information because public 
debtholders will accept a lower expected payoff in the exchange if the offer credibly 
reveals negative information. Firms with favourable rivate information will offer 
equity to bondholders to credibly convey this information and lower the bondholders ' 
reservation price. However, if a firm with favourable private information offers a 
highly contingent claim, such as equity, the claim is undervalued by creditors. 
Therefore when the firm has favourable private information, it offers bondholders the 
least contingent claim possible, such as senior or secured debt, even in the absence of 
holdout problems. 
This analysis is similar to Myers and Maijlufs (1984) adverse selection problem with 
equity issues. Participation by well-informed, secured or senior bank lenders in a 
restructuring can mitigate adverse selection problems. In particular, banks and other 
private lenders are generally assumed to be better inforined about the firm's prospects 
than public security holders [James (1987)]. Moreover, the potential conflict over the 
disposition of the firm's assets is likely to be greatest between stockholders and 
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secured bank creditors. Specifically, secured creditors will not exchange their debt for 
equity if liquidation is the highest valued use of the firm 's assets. Thus bank actions 
can provide bondholders with reliable information about the value of the firm's assets 
as a gomg concern. · 
To preserve value and enhance value maximisation investment, in case of default, 
Zender (1991) suggests that ownership of control be transferred to the bondholders. 
This will attenuate the effect of asymmetric information on the investment opportunity 
and the efficiency of the decision making 
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2.3. Holdout problem. 
One obstacle to recontracting financial claims is the difficulty of binding all 
bondholders to participate in a restructuring plan. Individually, each bondholder has 
an incentive not to forgive principal or exchange his claims if he or she believes other 
bondholders will make the concessions needed to return the firm to solvency. Firms 
that face holdout by a greater number of bondholders will have more difficulty 
restructuring their debt. In the extreme, they may fail altogether to recontract their 
claims and will have to liquidate [Roe (1987) and Gertner and Scharf stein (1991 )]. 
Smith and Warner ( 1979) conjecture that private recontracting of claims will be easier 
when the debt is privately placed and owned to few lenders. On the other hand, having 
fewer bondholders could result in more frequent bargaining deadlocks. Smallness of 
numbers causes individual bondhnlders to feel more powerful and perceive greater 
Rand benefits to holding out. This situation may occur when there is heterogeneity of 
the firm ' s financial claims. 
Firms with more complex capital structure are hypothesised to succeed less often at 
recontracting their claims privately. The more bondholders' claims differ in seniority 
rights, security, and other features, the more likely that their claims will be treated 
differently under any proposal of recontracting. As a result there may be greater 
disagreements over whether a recontracting plan is equitable in its treatment of 
different claims. 
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Financial recontracting should be easier for firms that initially owe most of their debt 
to commercial banks and insurance companies, as the claims of institutional lenders 
are generally senior and secured [Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994)]. In 
addition, private debt (owed to institutional lenders) is restructured more easily than 
publicly traded debt.· 
However the acceptance by private lenders of restructuring may have an adverse 
information impact .on the quality of the firm, unless concomitantly the firm offers 
equity to private lenders and senior debt to public bondholders [Brown, James and 
Mooradian ( 1993)]. Bank concessions and public debt reductions may be related even 
in the absence of information or holdout problems. James (1996) refers to this as the 
"share the pain' hypothesis. 
The recontracting of public and private debt depends largely on market environment. 
Rajan (1992) considers a model of private debt in an economy that contains both 
arm's- length lenders and banks. In a bank-dominated economy, bank debt is easily 
renegotiated, because the bank is a monolithic, readily accessible creditor. In an 
arm' s-length economy, banks, like public bondholders, receive only public 
information. It makes it harder to contact these dispersed holders and any 
renegotiation suffers. from information and free-rider problems. 
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Summary of chapter 2. 
The chapter has made a survey of existing literature on impediments to financial 
recontracting. The theory of finance recognises that impediments to financial 
recontracting can stem from conflicts of interests among the firm claimholders, 
information asymmetry between poorly informed outside creditors and a better 
informed manager or insiders of the firm and holdout problem encountered when a 
firm debt is held by a large number of outside creditors. 
In considering the . agency costs of debt two types of conflicts of interests are 
identified: the manager-shareholder and the equityholder-bondholder conflicts. The 
agency costs of debt recognises that in case of default managers are always reluctant 
to relinquish control over the firm even if liquidating assets is the best alternative for 
shareholders. The agency costs of debt suggests that this conflict can be mitigated by 
the presence of risky debt in the capital structure. Debt in this case serves as a 
disciplining device to managers and forces them to provide information, thus reducing 
the information asymmetry between manager and shareholders. However, the agency 
cost of debt demands caution in liquidating assets that require job-specific skills and 
assets that are firm-specific. Job-specific assets can be sold to individuals who do not 
know how to manage them, forcing the buyer to hire a specialist to manage them. 
Assets that are firm-specific can be sold to firms in the industry that are credit-
constrained, leading .to the sale of assets below their value. 
The agency cost of debt suggests that the equityholder-bondholder conflict can be 
mitigated in different ways. First the firm can be allowed to eliminate existing debt or 
37 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n 
Chapter 2 Impediments to Financial Recontracting 
neutralise its effects before undertaking a new project. This can be done m the 
following ways: 
- eliminating or shortening the maturity of debt; 
- using callable debt to force bondholders to share in the residual value of the firm; 
- using convertible debt to eliminate the risk incentive problem of debt and 
- giving bondholders an equity claim. 
Secondly the agency conflict can be mitigated by designing ex-ante debt contract. This 
can be achieved by the following methods: 
- giving new debt sufficient seniority to equate their present and future expected cash 
flow; 
- collateralisation of assets to substitute low risk project with high risk project; 
- limiting the payment of dividend as a potential wealth transfer; 
- using secured debt to alleviate the underinvestment problem; 
- using leasing to alleviate the asset substitution problem and 
- analysing the repayment history of the borrower to lower borrowing cost of debt. 
Finally, the equityholder-bondholder conflicts of interests can be mitigated by 
renegotiating prior contracts of securities to resolve agency problems. Renegotiation is 
a bargaining game between securityholders, and this can be encouraged by: 
- reducing conflicts between long-term and short-term lenders who are fully paid in 
case of liquidation of assets; 
- making provision among equityholders and bondholders that the other party should 
buy out the other or find a third party to buy out the equityholder~bondholder claims. 
The second impediment to financial recontracting is information asymmetry between 
investors. Information asymmetry serves to signal in two ways: financial and agency 
signalling. Financial signalling focuses on asymmetric information between insiders 
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and outsiders of the firm and conveys a signal about the quality of the firm. The 
proportion of management equity conveys information about the quality of the firm. 
The presence of risky debt is advantageous in signalling firm quality and driving 
competitors out of the market because levered firms are believed to be low cost or 
undervalued. The agency signalling approach .suggests that debt repayment signals 
managerial reputation. In a bargaining process, management can offer bondholders 
equity to lower their· reservation price. Management with favourable information offer 
the least contingent claim such as senior or secured debt. Participation of banks in a 
restructuring signals reliable symmetric information. The best way to attenuate the 
asymmetric information is to transfer ownership to bondholders. 
The last impediment to financial recontracting is the holdout problem. Financial 
recontracting is easier when debt is privately placed or owed to few lenders. Being 
few in number, however, can cause individual bondholders to holdout in the presence 
of a complex capital structure. This can be also the case when the financial structure 
of a firm differs in seniority rights, security and other features . The recontracting of 
private debt may be affected by the legal and regulatory environment. In a bank-
dominated economy, bank debt is easily renegotiated. In an arm' s length economy, 
banks are like public bondholders in receiving public information, thus making it 
harder for dispersed bondholders to provide financial relief. 
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Chapter 3 Development of Hypothesis and Methodology 
3.1. Development of the hypothesis. 
The resolution of corporate failure is not driven primarily by the impediments to 
financial contracting. The regulatory and legal environment affect investment 
behaviour and costs of financial failure. The legal environment determines the types 
of corporate ownership and control and their resulting conflicts of interests among 
claimholders of the firm's assets The difference in regulatory environments defines 
the issue of shares with differential voting rights, the participation of institutional 
lenders in equity ownership and the establishment of particular organisational 
structure. 
The legal environment affects also the degree to which a market participant can 
reduce the inherent principal-agent conflict between the stockholders and bondholders 
of the firm. Observed differences in market participants' investment patterns and 
corporate financial behaviour between the U.S.A and Japan suggest that regulatory 
environments that produce very diffused corporate structure are not appropriate to 
resolve the conflicts of interests of a firm's claimholders [Prowse ( 1990)]. In addition, 
Japanese firms with · strong ties to institutional lenders or members of large industrial 
groupings reduce their costs of financial distress and are unlikely to go bankrupt 
[Suzuki and Wright (1985) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharsfstein (1990)] . 
In the light of these findings about the different effects of legal and regulatory 
environment in resolving corporate failure between the U.S.A and Japan, it seems 
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appropriate to explore how the South African legal and regulatory environment 
lessens the costs of financial failure, since South African companies share some 
features with their Japanese counterparts. 
In South Africa, the legal and regulatory environments have produced a corporate 
landscape dominated by pyramid holding companies and multi-tiered diversified 
corporate groupings. These structures have effectively concentrated the control of 
most public companies in the hands of a few entrepreneurial families as well as 
institutional lenders. The ownership and control of the major South African 
corporations have been widely separated. This separation is not, however, between 
managers and shareholders as is generally the case for largely diffused ownership 
structure. The separation that occurs is between those shareholders with the majority 
of the claims to corporate cash flows and a minority of shareholders with sometimes 
minor proportionate claims to ownership but with effective control over the firm's 
operating assets. 
The effective control by a minority of shareholders derives from the fact that the 
South African regulatory environment neither enforces nor encourages the principle of 
one share one vote as is the case in most regulatory environments where diffuse 
distribution of shareholdings necessarily implies a diffuse distribution of voting 
power. This, in tum, limits the incentive of shareholders to monitor and control 
management. The principle of proportionality of claims and control has been avoided 
by controlling shareholders in issuing shares without diluting their ownership claims, 
through a diversification of their portfolio into subsidiary operating companies. Thus, 
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a structure is created that is composed essentially of conglomerate companies with 
diverse interests, known as holding groups. 
The practice of control by holding groups is not unique to controlling families, it 
applies also to major insurance companies. These companies are different in character 
because there are no founding families' interests, but the sheer size of the funds under 
management enables them to achieve the benefits of diversification and control 
without concomitant dilution of ownership. In addition, these groups have in their 
control banks and other financial institutions. Other groupings of smaller size are 
listed on the JSE. These groups compete with established groups. 
The most important aspect of this structure is the relationship between financial 
institutions and other non group companies. The absence of restrictions on financial 
institutions' holding equity and debt in firms' financial claims gives this type of 
special creditor (contrary to other types of debt claims) the legal authority to watch 
over their financial claims more effectively than any other class of creditors by virtue 
of their control of voting rights attached to their shares. 
This pattern of ownership structure may give rise to a more intensive use of leverage 
in South African companies. If financial institutions are permitted to be major 
shareholders, the agency costs of debt should reduce the incentive to engage in wealth 
transferring policies if they are also large debtholders of the firm. 
The question on which this study focuses on is whether close financial links between 
group-affiliated companies and financial institutions allow firms to go into bankruptcy 
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when it is economic to liquidate them, that is, when the economic value of the firm is 
less than its break up value. 
South African group financing arrangements can moderate the costs of financial 
failure . These costs can be lessened in several ways. First, because there are 
controlling shareholders, probably a financial institution belonging to the group 
structure, and thus fewer creditors, free-rider problems are less severe. It is very 
difficult to negotiate with a large number of creditors and reach an agreement with all 
of them simultaneously. Holdout creditors can free ride on others. As discussed by 
Myers (1977), Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1990), 
difficulties in negotiating with creditors may lead to underinvestment and inefficient 
liquidation. Even if the firm has valuable investment opportunities, an individual 
bondholder may be reluctant to finance them because part of the greater future cash 
flows accrue to the holdout bondholders. Similarly, if it is efficient for bondholders 
collectively to write down their debt claims, a sole bondholder may be unwilling to do 
so because he bears all the cost and receives only part of the benefit. 
Second, the less restrictive regulations on equity investments by large financial 
institutions lessen the information asymmetry to them; they are what Jensen (1989a,b) 
defines as active investors with some control over firm policy. The main institutional 
lenders are probably well informed about the financial position of the firm and its 
prospects. The problem in obtaining credit because of information asymmetry is 
therefore reduced. 
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Bolton and Scharfstein (1989) present a model in which financial failure leads to 
inefficient liquidation even though there is only one creditor. It is very difficult to 
raise capital from one creditor. Even, in the presence of numerous creditors, it is 
difficult to agree to a financial restructuring that promotes investment and avoids 
inefficient liquidation. Gertner ( 1989) presents a model where information 
asymmetry, in the .Presence of more than two parties, leads to bargaining and 
inefficient liquidation. 
Finally, there are numerous direct and indirect financial links between suppliers, 
customers, and failing firms. Suppliers, customers and workers have implicit claims 
on the firm ' s assets. Group affiliation makes suppliers more willing to extend trade 
credit and invest in long-term supply relationship. Customers become more willing to 
buy from the firm and workers to provide their services. This shows the existence of 
more subtle forms of credit that are difficult to obtain when a firm is in financial 
failure. Suppliers may be unwilling to extend trade credit when it is not clear whether 
a firm will remain in business. Product market competitors may compete aggressively 
to convince trade creditors that it is unprofitable for the firm to remain in business. 
[Bolton and Scharfstein (1989)]. Moreover, consumers deciding whether to buy a 
durable item must decide whether the firm will be able to meet its implicit and explicit 
warranties [Titman (1984)]. 
Workers' productivity and confidence can be affected because a failing firm no longer 
provides job security to employees. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) analyse the difficulty 
of holding implicit claims. For example an employee receives an implicit claim from 
the firm that his employment will not be terminated. Except under extraordinary 
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circumstances the employee can neither market that claim nor buy similar implicit 
claims from other firms to protect him in case the firm does default. 
Group affiliation and financial institution links may be sufficient to overcome some of 
the problems associated with financial failure, but are by no means necessary. There 
are firms that do not belong to a group structure but have very strong ties to a single 
institutional lender. Such firms may not receive support from other affiliated firms, 
but in theory they should receive help from closely affiliated financial institutions 
In the light of evidence presented by Suzuki and Wright (1985) in identifying a set of 
Japanese firms that filed for bankruptcy, liquidation or reorganisation, it was 
concluded that group firms or firms with close ties to banks are more likely to be 
given interest or principal concessions by creditors. This suggests that concentration 
of financial claims or control by a minority of shareholders enables the firm to avoid 
bankruptcy and yet still resolve financial failure. Franks and Torous (1989) and 
Gilson, John and Lang (1990), examined some aspects of reorganisation of failing 
firms. They also find that (i) less solvent and less liquid firms entering bankruptcy 
consequently write down creditors' claims in comparison to private workouts, and (ii) 
deviations from the. rules of strict priority are larger in workouts. Deviations from 
absolute priority rule may be viewed as an ex post change in the priority of creditors. 
Because of more complex, lengthy and costly bankruptcy proceedings, creditors may 
have an incentive to purchase, prior to expiration, the shareholders' option to remain 
in reorganisation. The purchase takes the form of writing down creditors' claims and 
writing up those of shareholders, thereby giving rise to deviations from absolute 
priority. 
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A general view of financial failure is that it results from a mismatch between the 
currently available liquid assets of a firm and its current obligations under its debt 
contracts. Mechanisms for dealing with financial failure rectify the mismatch by either 
restructuring the financing assets or restructuring financing contracts, or both. 
Financial failure has important implications for the liquidity and leverage policies of a 
firm. In particular, when the costs of financial failure are high, the firm may maintain 
a larger fraction of its assets and/ or be cautious in taking on debt, thus affecting the 
corporate liquidity policy, and the leverage policy of a firm. The loss of value will be 
greater for intangible assets and assets that generate firm specific rents: these are 
growth opportunity, managerial firm specific human capital, monopoly power, and 
operating synergies whose value depends on the firm's assets being kept together. 
Financial failure will be costly for firms whose assets are more intangible or firm-
specific. 
This view is consistent with the findings of Gilson, John and Lang (1990), whose 
analysis of US firms· showed that firms that rely more on bank financing than on bond 
financing are more likely to restructure their claims outside the bankruptcy courts. 
Their study shows that asset and financial characteristics jointly determine the choice 
between informal aild formal reorganisation mechanisms. More specifically, financial 
failure is more likely to be resolved through private workouts when (i) a greater 
proportion of the firm ' s assets are intangible, (ii) a greater proportion of its debt is 
bank debt, and (iii) the firm has fewer lenders (fewer distinct classes of debt 
outstanding). 
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The economic reasoning underlying these findings is as follows. On the asset side, 
intangible assets proxy for the destruction of going concern value which would occur 
if financial restructuring fails and asset restructuring is required .. The going concern 
value that is saved i.f the firm maintains operations through a workout is higher, the 
higher the proportion of intangible assets. The greater the proportion of bank debt and 
concentration of creditors the greater the probability that a settlement will be reached 
in the bargaining process, leading to a successful workout. 
An empirical model on resolving financial failure uses the ratio of a firm ' s market 
value to the replacement costs of its assets, designated as Tobin' s q. The ratio is used 
as a proxy for the loss of going concern value due to assets sales [Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981)]. Replacement costs approximate what the firm's assets could be sold for 
piecemeal, and are positively correlated with the liquidation value of the assets. Firms 
with a higher market value/ replacement cost will have higher costs of assets 
liquidation [Alderson and Betker (1995)] . 
3.2. Hypothesis. 
From the analysis developed in section 3 .1, the hypothesis is that firms with a higher 
market value/ replacement cost will be more likely to recontract their financial claims 
privately and preserve the going-concern value in assets sales and premature 
liquidations than firrns with a lower Tobin's q. 
Formally stated, the null hypothesis is: 
Ho: There is no difference in the resolution of failing companies. 
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The following supplementary hypotheses attempt to analyse the patterns for 
reorganisation of failing firms. 
h I: Larger firms compared by their book value of assets are likely to recontract easily 
because the larger the firm the lower its probability of liquidation. 
h2 : Firms that experience a substantial decline in cash flow performance and liquidity 
are likely to take actions that generate short-term cash flow. They also likely to 
recontract quickly to preserve their going concern value 
h3: Firms that are highly levered are likely to recontract their claims because leverage 
acts as a catalyst for organisational change. 
h4: Firms that are likely to recontract their claims are firms that invest, short-term, 
more fixed assets that can be pledged in a liquidation, and using more collateral, thus 
reducing the likelihood of liquidation. 
h5: Firm that are likely to restructure their claims are likely to have more short-term 
debt that matures in less than year because short-term debt acts as an overhang. 
h6: Firms that are likely to restructure easily are given a going-concern certificate by 
an increase in ownership structure of inside and outside claims. 
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3.3. Research methodology. 
3.3.1. Sample selection. 
The choice of sample depends on how financial failure is defined. Among the many 
possible definitions of financial failure, a firm is considered to enter into financial 
failure when its listing is suspended or terminated at the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. For that purpose, the requirement is that the firm be listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange at the onset of financial failure. The sample is 
restricted to delisted companies that appeared in the December J.S.E monthly bulletin, 
during years 1986 to 1996. The bulletin contains all historical information on 
companies that were once or are still listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
This study uses a two-step sampling procedure. The definition used to qualify a 
company as a successful restructuring or unsuccessful is the following: A suspended 
or delisted company that is reinstated on the Stock Exchange is defined as a successful 
restructuring. It is a sign of going concern qualification by different claimants of the 
firm ' s assets. The reinstatement serves to submit a company to the discipline of the 
market. Contrary to a successful restructuring, a firm is considered an unsuccessful 
restructuring when it is delisted before or after an attempt to restructure its financial 
claims. The failure to be reinstated to the stock market is a no-confidence vote for a 
firm as a going-concern. Therefore, the unsuccessful debt restructuring cannot submit 
the firm to the competition and discipline of the market. 
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This study analyses a sample of 60 exchange-listed companies that were at one time in 
their history delisted during the period of 1986-1996; 28 firms were only once delisted 
and were reinstated and 32 were delisted following an attempted debt restructuring 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1: Sample description by year of delisting 
Year successful unsuccessful 
restructuring restructuring 
1986 3 -
1987 1 1 
1988 2 -
1989 3 1 
1990 6 3 
1991 2 4 
1992 2 6 
1993 5 5 
1994 3 5 
1995 1 3 
1996 
-
4 
Total 28 32 
This sampling method has three advantages. First, it excludes firms that were 
reinstated but delisted again after a number of years. These firms are excluded because 
they no longer meet the requirements of successful restructuring. This stricter 
selection rule left the sample with 28 firms out of 52 firms that were at one time in 
their history suspended and reinstated. The method also allows one to track firms at 
the start of their troubles. This will avoid the inclusion in the sainple of firms that are 
probably failing structurally because of industry distress. This applies particularly to 
firms that belong to the electronic, electrical and battery; clothing, footwear and 
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textiles; building and construction; furniture and household and retail and wholesale 
sectors. The sectors represented in the sample are shown in Table 2. Another 
advantage is that the sample excludes highly leveraged but profitable firms that may 
wish to amend certain terms in their debt contract to enable them to invest in net 
present value project. Based on historical information, it also excludes firms that were 
targets of takeover attempts or a merger and acquisition at the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 
Table 2: Sample description by sector 
Sector Number Sector Number 
Banks financial services 4 Gold. rand and others 5 
Beverages and hotels 1 Industrial holding 3 
Building and construction 1 Mining financial 1 
Clothing, foot and textiles 3 Other metals 1 
Curtailed operations 1 Paper, packaging 2 
Development capital . 5 Pharmaceutical, medical 1 
Electronic, electrical 3 Printing and publishimz: 1 
-
Engineering 8 Prooertv 2 
Financial insurance 1 Retail and wholesale 4 
Financial investment 1 Stores 6 
Furniture 3 Transportation 3 
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3.3.2. Measures. 
The measure used to identify the going concern value is the Tobin'q ratio, defined as 
the ratio of the market value of assets to the current replacement cost of assets. The 
numerator includes all the firm's debt and equity securities, not just its common stock. 
It represents the market value of a firm. The denominator approximates what the 
firm ' s assets could be sold for piecemeal, and is positively related to the liquidation 
value of the asset. The study uses the formula suggested by Brealey and Myers (1996) 
to calculate the Tobin's q. 
Tobin 's q =Market value of assets I Estimated replacement cost 
The estimated replacement cost of assets is the total book assets minus the book value 
of plant, equipment and inventories. The book value of plant and equipment is an 
inflation-adjusted value because inflation drives the value of plant and equipment well 
above their original cost. The book value of inventories remains the same because the 
general accounting practice in South Africa use the First In First Out (FIFO) method 
in stock evaluation. This stock valuation method is less influenced by the inflation rate 
than other methods. · 
Because the market values of a highly levered firm tend to be · extremely volatile, a 
three year average of the market value/ replacement cost is used in the empirical 
analysis as in Gilson et al (1990). The bank debt ratio is defined as the book value of 
debt owed to banks divided by the book value of short-term liabilities. This measure is 
different from that used by Gilson et al (1990), where the bank ratio is defined as the 
book value of debt owed to banks divided by the book value of total liabilities. 
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Another proxy variable used as an explanatory variable between successful and 
unsuccessful restructuring is the ratio of creditors to short term debt. The study of 
Gilson and al ( 1990) uses the number of debt contracts outstanding, because public 
disclosure requirements are such that short-term debt ownership cannot be identified 
reliably. As an alternative, this study uses the number of creditors as a proxy variable 
for free-rider problems and informational asymmetries. This measure can provide a 
relative weight of creditors' stake in financial restructuring of failing firms. 
The bank and creditors short-term ratio used in the study are averaged for three years . 
Averaging helps to mitigate problems of random fluctuations. Using past firm 
characteristics helps to reflect past firm policies. 
The maturity of debt proxy variables are calculated by the book value of long-term 
debt (debt that matures over a period of more than one year) and short-term debt (debt 
that matures over a period of less than one year) to total debt. These ratios provide an 
indication of debt maturity across the sample. 
Because of the group-dominant corporate structure in South Africa, a failing firm is 
particularly affected by the direct and indirect financial links with other group 
members. The study analyses change that occilrs in shareholdings. The variables used 
are directors' interest and minority interest to assess the change in equity holdings. 
The directors' interest represents the interest of equity holding held by insiders in the 
firm. The minority interest represents the interest of ordinary shareholders who do not 
sit on the board of directors, or outside shareholders. 
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Indication that a firm ' s performance is in decline is provided by analysing the firm 's 
cash flow for a period of three years. The measures used are the changes in earnings 
before interests and taxes (Ebit) and the average Ebit to total assets ratios. These cash 
flow measures can provide an indication of a decline of firm's performance preceding 
a suspension or delisting on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
3.3.3. Data sources. 
Because of the difficulty of finding data on delisted companies on the J.S.E starting 
from the year of delisting, various sources had to be consulted to generate information 
for this empirical analysis. These include financial statements of companies, Mc 
Gregor' s Who Owns Whom and the Bureau of Financial Analysis database. 
3.2.4. Statistics. 
The study tests for a difference between two population means. The study assumes 
that the sample is normally distributed, and the sampling distribution of the mean is 
precisely distributed. However the standard distribution of the sample is unknown, the 
appropriate confidence interval estimation of the sample is the T test. 
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3.2.5 Limitations. 
The use of the ratio of bank debt divided by the book value of short-term liabilities is 
due to the limitation imposed by the method of data collection which precludes the 
study from identifying the long-term debt owed to banks and other financial 
institutions. As an alternative, the present study uses the bank debt and overdraft that 
appear under the current liabilities. This is particular for most South African 
companies ' balance sheets that consider bank overdraft as part of the borrowings. The 
effect of this data limitation on the analysis is not clear because it is unclear what the 
empirical distinction between short-term and long-term debt should be. 
The one year demarcation between short-term and long-term debt used for accounting 
purposes does not necessarily correspond well with the distinction between short-term 
and long-term debt in theoretical models. In most models, the definition of short-term 
and long-term debt depends on the life of the project the debt is financing, which 
probably varies significantly across firms and may extend well past one year. In 
addition, the effective maturity of long-term debt is ambiguous. Debt contracts often 
contain clauses that convert long-term debt into short-term should the need arise. 
More complex is the fact that firms can continually roll over cominercial paper, which 
is technically short-term debt, and classify it as· long-term debt. 
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Summary of chapter 3. 
The chapter analyses impediments to financial recontracting, leading to the 
formulation of the hypothesis. The formulation of the hypothesis is done with regard 
to a particular contractual relationship that dominates the South African legal and 
regulatory environments. South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange are dominated by a pyramid structure which is controlled by a minority of 
shareholders with effective control over the assets. This particular control may lessen 
the monitoring costs. In addition, the absence of restriction of financial institutions 
from holding equity and debt may lessen the information asymmetry and free-rider 
problem. 
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Chapt~r 4 Resolution of Corporate Failure at the J.S.E. 
Introduction 
The chapter analyses the resolution of corporate failure on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). The sample contains firms that were delisted between 1986 and 
1996. Firms that were delisted and re-instated after a successful restructuring of their 
financial claims number 28 and constitute the sample for successful firms. Firms that 
were delisted on the JSE following an unsuccessful debt restructuring number 32 and 
constitute the sample for unsuccessful restructuring. 
Empirical studies predict how firms can successfully restructure their financial claims 
at the onset of financial failure [Gilson et al (1990)]. Assets and financial 
characteristics jointly determine the success of restructuring financial claims in the 
reorganisation plan of a firm. More specifically financial failure is more likely to be 
resolved through a private workout when a greater proportion of the firm ' s assets are 
intangible. Intangibles assets proxy for the destruction of going-concern value which 
would occur if financial recontracting fails and assets restructuring is required. This 
characteristic of as~ets hypothesise that when more assets are intangibles they are 
likely to be destroyed in an unsuccessful recontracting. Financial characteristics that 
hypothesise financial recontracting are bank debt and the number of creditors. The 
greater the proportion of debt that is private debt and the concentration of the number 
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of creditors, the greater the probability that a settlement on financial restructuring will 
be reached in the bargaining process, leading to a successful restructuring. 
Table 3: Descriptive stat1st1cs of assets and financial characteristics that hypothesise successful 
restructuring for firms that restructured their claims on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange after a 
delisting period and 'Vere re-instated and firms that were delisted after an unsuccessful debt 
restructuring. 
Successful restructuring. Unsuccessful restructuring 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max P value 
Market/ 1.9 1.18 .047 JO.I 1.0 .7 .025 4 .045297 
Replacement 
cost ratio 
Bank debt .3 .35 .0007 .9 5 .4 .069 2 .200391 
Number of 2.5 2 6 3.1 3 6 .204804 
creditors 
Table 3 presents selected characteristics of firms whether or not they successfully 
recontracted their claims. Firms that recontract their claims have a higher market 
value/ replacement cost ratio. Their mean and median are superior to the mean and 
median of unsuccessful firms, and the difference in mean is statistically significant at 
a p level of 0.045297. This is consistent with the theory that hypothesises that firms 
with more intangible assets are more likely to be restructured and preserve their going-
concern value. 
The ratio of bank debt shows that unsuccessful firms have higher mean and median 
values than successful firms. This is not consistent with the theory that hypothesises 
that firms with more bank debt are likely to obtain a debt relief and continue their 
operations. The difference in mean for the bank debt ratio is not statistically 
significant, at a p level of 0.200391 to conclude that the theory does not hold. 
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The number of creditors is lower for successful firms compared to the mean and 
median of unsuccessful firms. Their difference in mean is not statistically significant 
at a p level of 0.204892. However, the theory suggests that the fewer the number of 
creditors the less the holdout problem. 
The following sections analyse the test of the hypothesis for financial restructuring in 
depth. Section 4.1 ·analyses the market value/ estimated replacement cost ratio. 
Section 4.2 presents results on the bank debt ratio. The last section analyses the 
number of creditors. 
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4.1. Market value/ replacement cost ratio 
The ratio of market to replacement cost, defined as Tobin's q, is used as a proxy for 
the loss of going-concern value due to assets sale and premature liquidation associated 
with financial failure. Replacement cost approximates what the firm's assets could 
realise if sold piecemeal, and is generally positively correlated with the liquidation 
value of assets. Sheifler and Vishny (1992) and Titman and Wessel (1988) argued that 
the costs of liquidation are higher for firms that produce unique or specialised 
products. Tobin's q measures the quality for firms with intangible assets and assets 
that generate firm-specific rents. These are growth opportunities, management specific 
human capital, mon9poly power, and operating synergies whose value depends on the 
firm's assets being kept together. Financial failure can easily destroy a firm's assets 
and it may be more costly for firms with intangible assets and assets that generate 
firm-specific rents. Intangible assets and assets that generate firm-specific rents are 
typically traded in secondary markets, and represent discretionary future investment 
cost [Myers ( 1977)]. Liquidation costs are the costs incurred when assets are sold to 
raise cash and remedy financial failure [Brown, James and Mooradian (1992), 
Asquith, Gertner and Scharsftein (1991), Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) and Ofek 
(1993)]. Tobin's q ·also measures the quality of a firm's current and anticipated 
projects under existing management. · 
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Sample results 
Table 4: Summary statistics for the ratio of market value to the replacement cost for 
successful and unsuccessful firm. 
Successful 
Count 27 
Mean 1.9 
Median 1.18 
Standard error .40 
Standard deviation 2.1 
Quartile Range 
Lower quartile 
Upper quartile 
T stat 
P value 
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The analysis of the ratio of market value to the replacement cost of assets reveals that 
the differences both in mean and median of successful firms are higher than those of 
unsuccessful firms. The mean and median of successful firms are 1.9 and 1.18. The 
lower quartile is 0.615 and the upper quartile is 2.4. The mean and the median of 
unsuccessful firms are 1.0 and 0.7. The lower quartile is 0.54 and the upper quartile is 
1.2. The T statistic is higher and negative and the difference in mean is statistically 
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significant at a p level of 0.045297. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
developed in chapter 3 that firms with market value higher than the replacement cost 
of assets find delisting more costly than a private recontracting. This result is 
consistent with the views of Sheifler and Vishny (1992) and Titman and Wessel 
( 1988) that the costs of liquidation are higher for firms with more intangible assets 
and assets that generates firm-specific rent. 
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4.2 Bank short-term debt ratio 
Different factors affect firm reliance on bank borrowing. Those factors can generally 
be classified as focusing on one of the three primary concerns: the costs of monitoring 
and collecting information about firm borrowers, the likelihood and costs of 
inefficient liquidation, and the incentives to take actions harmful to lenders. 
Factors based on monitoring and information costs suggest that bank lending is 
especially important in overcoming adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Fama (1985), Smith ·and Warner (1979) find that smaller firms and firms with a higher 
proportion of intangible assets are expected to rely rimarily on bank financing. 
Barclay and Smith (1995) put forward a similar argument concerning a firm's reliance 
on short-term bank borrowing. Nakamura (1993) finds that small firms lower their 
information and monitoring costs by borrowing from banks that can collect 
comprehensive information from their transaction accounts. Large firms find bank 
Joans less advantageous because most of their transactions accounts are spread over a 
great number of banks. In addition, Yosha ( 1995) argues that the high disclosure of 
public debt may lead firms to yield sensitive information to rival firms. Private debt 
avoids the high disclosure, but still evokes competitive responses from rival firms 
who think the borrowers concealing . information about high quality projects. Thus, 
Y osha predicts that firms with high quality projects avoid public debt because it has 
two costs: the high. cost of information disclosure and the cost of competitive 
responses by rival firms when they learn the borrower has high quality projects. 
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Houston and James (1996) find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the 
importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and 
whether a firm has public debt outstanding. For firms with a single bank relationship, 
the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth 
opportunities. In contrast, among firms borrowing from multiple banks, the 
relationship is positive. 
Factors based on the efficiency of liquidation decisions focus on bank debt 
convenants. Berlin and Loeys (1988) find that the optimal debt choice trades off 
inefficient liquidation caused by harsh convenants against the agency costs of 
delegating monitoring to a bank that can conduct detailed investigations to help avoid 
these inefficiencies. In a related model, Berlin and Mester (1992) argue that while 
restrictive convenants protect lenders and thus allow lower interest rates, they can also 
interfere with optimal investment. Private debt can have harsher convenants than 
public debt because it is more easily renegotiated when convenants interfere with 
investments. According to Chemmanur and Fulghieri ( 1994 ), bank debt is attractive 
because it can be easily renegotiated for good firms when necessary to avoid 
inefficient liquidation. Firms with a greater likelihood of financial distress place 
greater value on renegotiability even though bank debt is expensive. 
Models based on borrower's incentives focus on reputation. According to Hoshi, 
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993), banks monitor managers to discourage unprofitable 
investment. Similarly, Diamond ( 1991 a) suggests that firms borrow and repay 
monitored bank loans until sufficient history of non-default is established. Rajan 
(1992) predicts that the preference for bank debt is related to a borrower's bargaining 
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power with lenders. He suggests that empirical proxies for bargaining power might be 
the degree of control banks have over a borrower's suppliers or the degree of the 
bank's equity ownership of the borrower, neither of which are not publicly available. 
Sample results 
Table 5: Summary statistics for the ratio of bank short-term debt to total debt for 
successful and unsuccessful firms. 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 18 15 
Mean .3 .5 
Median .29 .4 
Standard Error .059 .097 
Standard deviation .3 .37. 
Quartile Range .4 .4 
Lower quartile .074 .26 
Upper quartile .5 .6 
T stat 1.3092 
P value .200391 
Results in Table 5 reveal that successful firms have lower mean and median values 
than unsuccessful fim1s. The mean of bank short-term debt for successful firms is 0.3 
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and the median 0.29. Unsuccessful firms have a mean of 0.5 and a median of 0.4. The 
lower quartile value is 0.074 for successful firms and 0.26 for unsuccessful firms . 
Successful and unsuccessful firms present the same level of upper quartile value of 
0.4. Results in Table 5 are not consistent with most of the theoretical models 
developed earlier, in chapter 3 and section 4.2. In chapter five, the study finds that 
successful firms are smaller by size measured by the book value of assets. This 
indicates that results of section 4.2 are in contradiction with the prediction of Smith 
and Warner ( 1979) that smaller firms with a high proportion of intangible assets 
should rely primarily on bank financing. The model of Nakamura (1993) suggests that 
small firms can lower their information and monitoring costs by borrowing from 
banks. Yosha (1995) predicts that firms with high quality projects can rely on bank 
debt to avoid high disclosure of information associated with public debt and the 
spreading of sensitive information to rival firms . In addition, these results are in 
contrary to the prediction of with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) that bank debt is 
associated with renegotiation for good firms to avoid inefficient liquidation. 
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4.3 Number of creditors 
Financial recontracti,ng is difficult for firms that are likely to have significant conflicts 
among its creditors arising from the free-rider problem and information asymmetry. 
Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1990) point out that a free-
rider problem reduces the incentive for creditors to grant financial relief or extend 
credit. When there are many creditors in a recontracting process, it is very difficult to 
renegotiate with all of them and this difficulty may lead to underinvestment and 
inefficient liquidation. Even if the firm has valuable investment opportunities, an 
individual creditor may be reluctant to finance them because part of the greater future 
cash flows will accrue to the holdout creditors. Similarly, even if it is inefficient for 
creditors to write down debt, a sole creditor may be unwilling to do so because he 
bears all the cost and receives only part of the benefit. 
Moreover, when de~t is diffusely held, creditors are not likely to be well informed 
about the firm and may not know whether to provide new capital or interests and 
principal concession. In this case, it is difficult to raise capital from one creditor, let 
alone get numerous creditors to agree to a financial recontracting that promotes 
investment and avoids inefficient liquidation. There are also more subtle forms of 
credit such as credit with customers and suppllers that are more difficult to obtain 
when a firm is in financial failure. 
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Sample results 
Table 6: Summary statistics for the number of financial creditors for successful and 
unsuccessful firms. . 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 22 20 
Mean 2.5 3.0 
Median 2.0 3.0 
Standard Error .3402 .37381 
Standard deviation 1.6 2. 
Quartile Range 3.0 3.0 
Lower quartile 1.0 1.5 
Upper quartile 4.0 4.5 
T stat .96525 
P value .204804 
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Results in Table 6 reveal that successful firms have lower mean and median number 
of creditors. The mean number of creditor is 2~5 and the median is 2.0 for successful 
firms. Unsuccessful firms have a mean number of creditors of 3.0 and a median 
number of creditors 3.0. The lower quartile number of creditors is 1.0 for successful 
firms and 1.5 for unsuccessful firms. The upper quartile number of creditors is 4.0 for 
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successful firms and 4.5 for unsuccessful firms. These results are consistent with the 
predictions of Myers (1977), Bulow and Shoven (1978) and Gertner et al (1990) on 
free-rider problem and information asymmetry. However, the difference in mean 
between the sub-samples is not statistically significant at p level of 0.204804 to 
conclude that the hy{'othesis developed in chapter 3 has been validated. 
Summary of chapter 4. 
The chapter analyses the mechanisms of financial restructuring, The hypothesis 
developed in chapter 3 hypothesises that assets and financial restructuring jointly 
determine the mechanisms of financial restructuring. The study finds that assets 
characteristics, that is the ratio of market value to the estimated replacement cost of 
assets, is higher and ·statistically significant. This result is consistent with the views of 
Titman and Wessels(1988), Scheifler and Vishny (1992), Jensen (1989a,b) and Gilson 
et al (1990) that firms with more intangible assets restructure their claims more easily 
to preserve their going-concern value. 
The study finds that firms with more intangible assets have less bank debt and fewer 
creditors. The bank short-term debt ratio is in contradiction with most theoretical 
models that associate private debt as proxy variable for successful debt restructuring. 
Chenmanur and Fulghieri ( 1994) suggest that bank debt · is associated with 
renegotiation for good firms to avoid inefficient liquidation. Y osha ( 1995) predicts 
that firm with high quality project will use bank debt. This result is contrary to the 
prediction of Nakamura ( 1995) that links size with information and monitoring costs, 
suggesting that small firms should rely on bank debt ( see chapter 5). 
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The study finds that successful firms have fewer creditors than unsuccessful firms. 
The result is consistent with the predictions of Myers (1977), Bulow and Shoven 
(1978) and Gertner et al (1990) on free-rider problem and information asymmetry. 
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Chapter 5 Sample Assets Characteristics 
Introduction. 
The chapter describes the characteristics of selected firms. One of these characteristics 
is the size of the sample measured by the book value of assets. The size of the firm is 
linked to bargaining complexity, choice of security sources credit risk and monitoring 
and information costs. The second assets characteristic is cash flow liquidity measured 
by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities or current ratio. Cash flow liquidity 
provides a measure of liquid funds in excess of current obligation that is available as a 
margin of uncertainty to which flow of funds may be subject. Cash flow performance 
characteristic is measured by three variables. The first and second variables of cash 
flow performance are measured by the change in Ebit to total assets in the pre-distress 
year and during the base year. The third measure of cash flow performance is an 
average three year ratio of Ebit to total assets. These measures attempt to monitor 
earnings performance of the sample. The recontracting period measures the time spent 
in reorganisation after a suspension or delisting on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
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Table 7: Selected firms and sample characteristics for firms that successfully 
restructured their claims and were re-instated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
and firms that were delisted after a debt restructuring. 
Successful restructuring Unsuccessful restructuring 
Characteristic Mean . Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max P value 
I. Size 
Book value of I I 1333.8 27674 1421 906157.7 490607.9 137743 4664 4110088 .065693 
Assets (000) 
2. Cash flow 
liquidity 
Current ratio 3.5 1.63 1.53 29.5 1.9 I .4 . I 11 IO .204601 
3. Cash flow 
performance 
Change in Ebit/ -.3 -.6 -1.40 I 2.8 -.7 .019 -13 .695 9 .736948 
Total assets 
Change in Ebit .021 -. 19 -2.237 2.7 -.4 . I -8.778 2 .518985 
base year 
Change in Ebit -.5 -.78 -2.595 3.5 -.3 .2 -42.647 20 .917468 
distress year 
4. Recontracting 7.6 7.0 .03 24 5. I .03 .03 30 .248972 
period( months) 
The results in Table 7 indicate that firms that successfully restructure their claims 
have a small book value of assets. The difference in means is significant at a p level of 
0.065693. This result is contrary to most theories which predict that large firms 
succeed in restructuring their debt. 
An analysis of cash flow liquidity shows that the mean of the current ratio for 
successful firms is higher. The difference in median also indicates that the median of 
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the current ratio for. successful firms is marginally higher for successful firms . The 
difference in mean is not, however, statistically significant at a p level of 0.05 to 
conclude any difference in current ratio for the sub sample. Both successful and 
unsuccessful firms performed poorly three years before delisting on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. The average ratio of Ebit to total assets for that period indicates that 
the means of both successful and unsuccessful firms are negative. It is indicated that 
the median value of the ratio of Ebit to total assets is marginally higher than zero for 
unsuccessful firms . Analysis of cash flow performance in base and distress years 
shows that the cash flow performance of successful firms went from bad, in base year, 
to worse in distress year. The mean of the ratio of change in Ebit to total assets is 
positive and marginally higher than zero for successful firms. The median is negative 
for successful firms . The opposite applies to unsuccessful firms where the mean is 
negative and the median positive in base year. The results in distress year indicate that 
both the mean and median are negative and lower for successful firms. However, 
unsuccessful firms with a negative mean have a positive median value, marginally 
higher than zero. Results obtained from the different ratios of cash flow performance 
are not statistically significant to indicate any difference in sub-sample performance. 
An analysis of the recontracting period shows that both the mean and the median are 
higher for successful firms than for unsuccessful firms. They both have the same 
minimum period of recontracting. However, the maximum period of recontracting is 
higher for unsuccessful firms. The difference . in mean for the recontracting period 
between successful and unsuccessful firms is not statistically significant to conclude 
that there is a difference in recontracting time required by successful and unsuccessful 
firms . 
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5.1. Size. 
A number of authors have suggested that leverage and other firm characteristics may 
be related to size. Warner (1970) and Ang, Chua, and Mc Connell (1982) provide 
evidence that large · firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to financial 
failure. The underlying reason is that all else being equal, the larger the firm the 
greater its potential to diversify its non-systematic risk, thereby making its bond less 
risky. 
The size of the firm is also linked to bargaining complexity. Weiss ( 1990) suggests 
that equity deviation in formal reorganisation is positively related to the size of the 
distressed firms. In this case, the size of the firm is an important determinant in equity 
deviation because it is correlated with bargaining complexity. Large size implies that 
on average more parties are involved in negotiation, making it more difficult for 
creditors to form workable coalitions resulting in larger equity deviation. 
In addition, the size of a firm is linked to the choice of security sources. Smith (1977) 
finds that small firms pay much more than large firms to issue new equity and long 
term debt. This suggests that small firms may be more leveraged and may prefer to 
borrow short term, ~hrough bank loans, rather than issue long-term debt because of 
lower fixed costs associated with this alternative. Smith's arguments are consistent 
with the monitoring and information costs hypothesis. Fama (1985) argues that large 
firms find it more economical to produce the information required for public 
securities, and thus borrow publicly rather than rely on bank debt or private debt. The 
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same line of reasoning is consistent with Nakamura's (1993) argument that bank 
borrowing is less beneficial for larger firms because their transactions accounts spread 
over a greater number of banks than small firms' accounts, and thus provide less 
useful information. Information cost is also associated with high quality projects. 
Y osha ( 1995) finds that firms with high quality projects prefer to avoid the high costs 
of information disclosure associated with public debt. 
Models based on the efficiency of liquidation decisions suggest that unobservable 
credit risk is related to size. Berlin and Loeys (1988) predict that bank debt use 
increases lender informedness and decreases monitoring costs. 
Sample results 
Table 8: Summary statistics for firms ' size for successful and unsuccessful firms (in 
thousands of Rands). 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 29 28 
Mean 111333.8 491607.9 
Median 27674 137743.0 
Standard error 37074.58 202532.1 
Standard deviation 199652.7 1071699 
Quartile Range 113609.6 198652.3 
Lower quartile 9991.667 34465.17 
Upper quartile 123601.3 233117.5 
T stat 1.87796 
P value .065693 
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The study measures' firm size by the book value of assets. The descriptive statistics 
contained in Table 8 shows that firms that restructure their claims successfully are 
smaller than unsuccessful firms . The mean of successful firms is RI 11333800 and the 
median size is R27674000. The smallest firm has a value of assets of Rl421000 and 
the biggest has as?ets with a book value of R906 l 577000. These values are 
concentrated around the mean and the median. Twenty five per cent of firms have an 
book value of assets of R999 l 667 and the upper quartile or seventy five per cent of 
firms have a book value of assets ofR123601300. 
While the dispersion of size for successful firms is concentrated around the mean and 
median, different patterns are observed for unsuccessful firms. The mean value of 
book assets is R491607900 and the median value is R137743000. The smallest firm 
has a book value of assets estimated at R4664000 and the largest firm has a book 
value of assets of R4111008800. The lower quartile or twenty five per cent of firms 
have a book value of assets of R34465 l 70 and the upper quartile have a book value of 
assets of R2333l17$00. The dispersion of central values is shown for size compared 
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by the book value of assets by figure 7. The difference observed in firm size suggests 
that the mean and the median for unsuccessful and successful firms are different. This 
is proved by the significant at p level of 0.0065693 and a higher T value of 1.87796. 
In addition, results contained in Table 14 (see chapter 6) show that small, successful 
firms are more highly leveraged than large, unsuccessful firms as compared by the 
means of the market to book ratio and total liabilities to total assets. The market to 
book ratio is 1.1 for successful firms and 0.5 for unsuccessful firms. The ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets is 0. 7 for successful firms and 0.6 for large firms. Moreover 
small successful firms use lower bank debt than large, unsuccessful firms, less long-
term debt and the same level of short-term financing. 
However, it is to be noted that the differences in mean for these results are not 
statistically significant at a p level of 0.05 . The study can not therefore conclude that 
firm size is not consistent with the suggestions of Warner (1970) and Ang, Chua and 
Mc Connell (1982) that large firms should be highly leveraged. 
This applies also to argument of Smith ( 1977) that large firms may prefer to issue 
long-term debt. The results suggest the opposite but the significance of the difference 
in mean for long-term and short term debt does not allow the study to conclude that 
these predictions are not consistent with results shown in Table 7. 
Firm size may not be related to the predictions based on information and monitoring 
costs [Fama (1985) .and Nakamura (1993)]. Large, unsuccessful firms in the sample 
use more bank debt than small, successful firms . The information cost associated with 
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the use of bank debt for high quality projects may also be inconsistent with the 
argument of Y osha ( 1995) that firms that use more bank debt have high quality 
projects. It is observed that unsuccessful firms use more bank debt than successful 
firms. The statistically insignificant p level between the mean in the use of bank debt 
(see section 4.6.2 ) does not allow any conclusive prediction for the models based on 
the efficiency of liquidation decisions that suggests that observable credit is linked to 
size. 
Weiss (1990) has suggested that equity deviation in formal reorganisation is positively 
related to size of the distressed firms . Size may be an important determinant in equity 
deviation because it .is correlated with bargaining complexity. Larger size implies that, 
on average, more parties are involved in negotiations, making it more difficult for 
creditors to form workable coalitions resulting in larger equity deviations. 
78 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n 
Chapter 5 Sample Assets Characteristics 
5.2. Cash flow liquidity and performance. 
Empirical studies provide evidence that firms that perform poorly file for bankruptcy 
protection. Gilson et al (1990) find that 53% of firms that performed poorly for at 
least three consecutive years filed for bankruptcy protection. The difference in 
proportion of bankruptcy filings between firms that restructured their debt 
successfully and those unsuccessful firms that filed for bankruptcy protection may be 
attributable to the length of the poor performance. 
Stulz (1990) and Jensen (1986) use the free cash flow argument to predict a positive 
relation between leverage and actions that generate short-term cash flow. These 
models imply that d~bt service obligation will induce poorly performing firms to sell 
assets and divest operations. 
An indication of sample liquidity is provided by the analysis of the current ratio. The 
decline in sample performance is provided by the analysis of the change in Ebit 
standardised by total assets during a pre-distress year or base year and the distress 
year. Another indication of performance is provided by the analysis of a three year 
change in the ratio of Ebit to total assets. 
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5.2.1. Cash flow liquidity 
Jensen (1989) argues that highly levered firms respond faster to a decline in value than 
their less levered counterparts because a small decline in value can lead to an earlier 
default. Jensen's argument implies that a highly levered firm is more likely to 
restructure its operating performance and financial claims quickly to preserve its going 
concern value. When leverage is initially low, default occurs only after continuing 
losses drive the firm value substantially below its going concern value. 
The decline in firm value gives creditors, in case of default, a right to monitor and 
demand restructuring because their contract with the firm has been breached. They can 
push the firm to liquidate or reorganise. Leverage can therefore lead to value 
maximisation by triggering liquidation [Titman (1984)]. 
Harris and Raviv ( 1990) and Ofek (1991) report that debtholders monitor a firm after 
default and induce it to take value maximising actions regardless of the effect on 
short-term cash flow. The short-term cash flow solvency and liquidity measure is 
provided by the current ratio. It measures the degree to which current assets cover 
current liabilities. The excess of current assets over current liabilities provides a buffer 
against losses that may be incurred in the disposition or liquidation of the current 
assets other than cash. It provides, also, a measure of the reserve of liquid funds in 
excess of current obiigation that is available as a margin of safety against uncertainty 
and the random shocks to which the flow of funds is subject. Random shocks, such as 
strikes, extraordinary losses, and other uncertainties, can temporarily and 
80 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n 
Chapter 5 Sample Assets Characteristics 
unexpectedly stop or reduce the inflow of funds . A lack of liquidity may mean that the 
firm is unable to take advantage of profitable business as they arise. At this stage a 
lack of liquidity implies a lack of freedom of choice as well as constraints on 
management' s freedom of movement. 
Sample results 
Table 9: Summary statistics of current ratio for successful and unsuccessful firms. 
Count 
Mean 
Median 
Standard Error 
Standard deviation 
Quartile Range 
Lower quartile 
Upper quartile 
T stat 
P value 
f9Je 9 
hol caslllbw~ 
Successful 
28 
3.5 
1.63 
1.08 
5.9 
1.6 
.971 
2.6 
-1.28499 
.204601 
12 --·-- - ------·--------
10. 
s· 
o· 
·2 
-4 ·· - - - _____ : --
Unsu:cesshJ Soo::essfll 
Unsuccessful 
25 
1.9 
1.4 
.4 
2. 
1.0 
1.0 
2.0 
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The analysis of the sample results contained in Table 9 shows that the mean value of 
the current ratio is 3.5 for successful firms and 1.9 for unsuccessful firms. The 
difference is apparent by examining the box and whisker plots (figure 9 and 10) for 
the difference in mean. However, the analysis of the median shows that both 
successful and unsuccessful firms have a lower median value, 1.63 for successful 
firms and 1.4 for unsuccessful firms. This is confirmed when analysing the box and 
whisker plots for the difference in median value. This implies that the higher level in 
mean for successful firms is influenced by upward outliers. The analysis of other 
measures of dispersion tends to confirm this effect. The quartile range is 1.6 for 
successful firms and 1.0 for unsuccessful firms. The lower quartile values for the 
sample are very close with 0.971 for successful firms and 1.0 for unsuccessful firms. 
Differences appear in the upper quartile values where successful firms have an upper 
quartile value of 2.6 as compared to 2.0 for unsuccessful firms. 
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5.2.2. Cash flow performance 
The judgements of a proper cash flow performance are based on a close and frequent 
monitoring of earnings performance as compared with earlier estimates or 
performance. The variability of earnings is an important factor in the determination of 
the coverage standard of a firm. In addition, the durability and the trend of earnings 
are important factors that must be considered apart from the variability. 
Results contained in Table 7 show that successful firms performed better than 
unsuccessful firms with a mean ratio of Ebit to total assets of -0.3 for successful firms 
and -0.7 for unsuccessful firms. This ratio measures a three year average performance. 
However, this average measure does not provide any indication on how these firms 
performed at the onset of financial failure. Firm performance varies largely from one 
period to another and, for this purpose, an analysis of firm performance and variability 
is provided by analysing the change in Ebit scaled by total assets. The change in cash 
flow performance is reported as the change in base year and distress year. An analysis 
of the results contained in Table 7 shows that successful firms performed better in 
base year with a mean value of 0.021 as compared to -0.4 for unsuccessful firms. 
However, this cash flow performance deteriorated further in distress year for 
successful firms than for unsuccessful firms. The mean ratio of cash flow performance 
is -0.5 for successful firms and -0.3 for unsuccessful firms. This shows that, while 
value deteriorated further for successful firms, at the same time progress was observed 
for unsuccessful firms. 
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5.2.2.1. Average ratio of Ebit to total assets 
Sample results 
Table I 0: Summary statistics for the ratio of operating profit to total assets for 
successful and unsuccessful firms. 
Successful 
Count 20 
Mean -.3 
Median -.60 
Standard error .24 
Standard deviation I. I 
Quartile Range .9 
Lower quartile -1.0 
Upper quartile -.I 
T stat -.33858 
P value .736948 
6-----------
2 
Unsuccessful 
I7 
-.7 
.OI 9I 
I. I 
5. 
.8 
-.45 
.3 
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8· 
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The results in Table I 0 show that unsuccessful firms performed poorly compared to 
successful firms. The average ratio of Ebit to total assets for a period of three years 
indicates poor performance for both successful and unsuccessful firms. The mean 
value is -0.3 for successful firms and -0. 7 for unsuccessful firms. The difference in 
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median values indicates a median value of -0.60 for successful firms and 0.019 for 
unsuccessful firms. 
Analysis of other measures of dispersion and box and whisker plots indicates a large 
dispersion for unsuccessful firms. Dispersion values are centred around the median for 
successful firms with a quartile range of 0.9, a lower quartile value of -1.0 and upper 
quartile of -0. l. The minimum value is l.401 and the maximum is 2.8. On the other 
hand, unsuccessful firms have a minimum value of -13.695 and a maximum value of 
9. Indication of dispersion values provided by Table 10 shows that the quartile range 
is 0.8, the lower quartile is -0.45 and the upper quartile 0.3. The difference in mean is 
not statistically significant at a p level of 0.05 and the inconclusiveness of the results 
necessitates a further study of how poor performance varied over time. 
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5.2.2.2. Change in Ebit to total assets during the base year. 
Sample results 
Table 11: Summary statistics for the ratio of Ebit 1 to total assets for successful and 
unsuccessful firms . 
Successful 
Count 17 
Mean .021 
Median -.19 
Standard error .31 
Standard deviation 1.3 
Quartile Range .9 
Lower quartile -.55 
Upper quartile .4 
T stat -.65211 
P value .518985 
F~ 13 
Mean of cash lb# pe!foonarce 
2.5 
15 
~-1.5 
-2.5 
.J.5 
Unsuccessful 
17 
-.4 
.1 
.6 
2. 
1.1 
-.66 
.5 
2· I 
I 
I 
01 
I 
.!!l ! ~ 2' :l . I 
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::: "" I 
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Table 11 shows that successful firms performed better than unsuccessful firms 
compared by their mean value. Table 11 indicates a mean value of 0.021 for 
successful firms and-0.4 for unsuccessful firms. However the analysis of the 
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difference in median suggests the opposite. This time, the median value for successful 
firms is lower at -0.19 and the median value for unsuccessful firms is 0.1 An analysis 
of the box and whisker plots for the median (figure 14), shows clearly that the lower 
mean value is affected by downward outliers. Other measures of dispersion give a 
quartile range of 0.9 for successful firms and 1.1 for unsuccessful firms. The lower 
quartile is -0.55 for successful firms and -0.66 for unsuccessful firms . The upper 
quartile is 0.4 for successful firms and 0.5 for unsuccessful firms. These results show 
that central and dispersion values are centred around the mean for successful firms in 
comparison with results obtained for unsuccessful firms. The difference is not, 
however, statistically significant with a p level of 0.518985 and a negative and lower 
T stat of -0.65211 to allow the conclusion that there was any difference in 
performance during the base year. 
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5.2.2.3. Change in Ebit to total assets during the distress year. 
Sample results 
Table 12: Summary statistics for the ratio of Ebit 2 to total assets for successful and 
unsuccessful firms . 
8. 
-10 
·16 
Count 
Mean 
Median 
Standard error 
Standard deviation 
Quartile Range 
Lower quartile 
Upper quartile 
T stat 
P value 
flp! 15 
Meanof c:ash.fllw~ 
Successful Unsuccessful 
22 17 
-.5 -.3 
-.78 .2 
.29 3.0 
1.3 12 
1.5 1.2 
-1.282 -.18 
.3 1.0 
.10433 
.917468 
)) i 
20 . 
10; 
Results displayed iri Table 12 shows that firin performance deteriorated further for 
successful firms at the same period where unsuccessful firms performed better than in 
base year. During the distress year, the mean value of successful firms is -0.5 while 
unsuccessful firms present a mean value of -0.3. This poor performance is confirmed 
when analysing the median values. The median value for successful firms is -0. 78 and 
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0.2 for successful firms. Other measures of dispersion give a quartile range of 1.5 for 
successful firms and 1.2 for unsuccessful firms. The lower quartile is -1.282 for 
successful firms and -0.18 for unsuccessful firms. The upper quartile is 0.3 for 
successful firms and 1.0 for unsuccessful firms. These results are not statistically 
significant with a p level of 0.917468. A comparison of firm performance during the 
base and distress year gives an indication that the value of successful firms 
deteriorated quickly. This may be consistent with the theory that firms experiencing a 
substantial decline in cash flow performance react quickly to preserve their going 
concern value [Jensen (1989)]. 
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5.3 Recontracting period. 
The recontracting period represents the time spent in informal reorganisation. The 
period in informal · reorganisation is measured from the suspension date at the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the date a firm is re-instated or delisted from the 
Stock Exchange. 
Sample results 
Table 13 : Summary statistics for the recontracting period for successful and 
unsuccessful firms (In months). 
Successful 
Count 28 
Mean 7.6 
Median 7.00 
Standard error 1.17 
Standard deviation 6.2 
Quartile Range 8.0 
Lower quartile 3.0 
Upper quartile 11.0 
T stat -1.16671 
P value .248972 
11 .--·---· ------------- i 
-g 10 
-~ 
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Unsuccessful 
23 
5.1 
.03 
1.8 
9. 
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.03 
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The sample results show that successful firms spend more time in reorganisation of 
their financial structures than unsuccessful firms. The mean value of time spent in 
reorganisation is 7.6 months for successful firms and 5.1 months for unsuccessful 
firms. There is huge gap in differences of time spent during reorganisation when 
analysing the dispersion around central values. The median time spent in 
reorganisation is 7.0 months for successful firms and 0.03 for unsuccessful firms . This 
result suggests that 50% of unsuccessful firms are not granted a suspension period and 
are just delisted the same day on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. An examination 
of the quartiles show that 25% of unsuccessful firms are delisted after 0.03 month or 
one day trading. The lower quartile time spent in reorganisation is 3.0 months for 
successful firms. The upper quartile values show that the time spent in reorganisation 
for successful firms is 11 months and 10 months for unsuccessful firms. The upper 
quartile value for unsuccessful firms is influenced upward by the average time spent 
in reorganisation for unsuccessful firms as shown by figure 18. 
Summary of chapter 5. 
The study finds that size characteristic is not consistent with the suggestion of Warner 
(1970) and Ang, C~ua and Mc Connell (1982) that small firm should not be highly 
levered (see results in chapter 6). Size characteristic is not related to information and 
monitoring costs as predicted by Fama (1985), Nakamura (1993) and Yosha (1995). 
This is because small firms use less bank debt which signals project quality. However 
the findings are consistent with the argument of Weiss ( 1990) that size is correlated 
with bargaining complexity. 
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Models based on the free cash flow theory [Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)] predict a 
relation between leverage and actions that generate short-term cash flow. In addition, 
firms that experience a substantial decline in cash flow performance react quickly to 
preserve their going concern value [Jensen (1989)]. The findings are consistent with 
these predictions. Firms that restructure their claims successfully experienced a sharp 
decline in their cas~ flow performance. However, the time spent in recontracting 
mechanisms is longer for successful firms than the time spent by unsuccessful firms. 
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Chapter 6 Leverage Characteristics I 
Introduction 
Different measures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are market to 
book ratio and total liabilities to total assets. Some theories of capital structure have 
different implications for the different types of debt. Total leverage is analysed by 
using two leverage ratios. The first is the ratio of total debt to the market value of 
assets and the second is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Each ratio may 
contain some measurement error, in the sense that management may refer to some 
other ratio or variable when setting their firm 's debt level. Titman and Wessels ( 1988) 
report that some managers consider leverage ratios based on market values when 
setting their firm ' s debt level, while others look at leverage based on book values. 
However, there is no reason to expect either of the two leverage ratios used to be a 
biased estimate of the "true" leverage ratio. 
The need to compute two leverage ratios arises from the fact that accounting data 
place emphasis on historical costs rather than on current values. It is assumed that the 
valuation placed by the market recognises the current value of assets and their earning 
power. Objection to the use of market values is generally due to their volatile 
character. This argument is countered in the study by the use of average market value 
and debt for a period of three years. The use of average value can therefore provide 
more realistic leverage ratios. 
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Table 14: Leverage characteristics for firms that successfully restructured their claims 
and were re-instated at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and firms that were delisted 
after a debt restructuring 
Successful firms Unsuccessful firms 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max p value 
Market book I. I .66 .021 7.1 .5 .4 .008 2 .071993 
ratio 
Debt book .7 .57 . 154 2 . .6 .7 .017 .29547 
value of assets 
Leverage characteristics in Table 14 indicate that the mean and the median of the 
market to book ratio are higher for successful firms. The differences in means and 
medians are significant at a p level of 0.072. The mean ratio of debt to the book value 
of assets is higher for successful firms than unsuccessful firms but the opposite occurs 
with the difference in median values. The minimum market to book ratio value is 
0.021 for successful firms and 0.008 for unsuccessful firms . The maximum market to 
book value is 7.1 for successful firms and 2 for unsuccessful firms . The results 
obtained for the difference in the ratio of debt to book value of assets show that 
successful firms have a higher mean value than unsuccessful firms. The mean value of 
debt to book value of assets is 0.7 for successful firms and 0.6 for unsuccessful firms. 
The median value is higher for unsuccessful firms with a debt to book value of 0. 7 
and 0.57 for successful firms . The minimum debt to book value is 0.154 for successful 
firms and 0.017 for unsuccessful firms. The maximum is 1 for unsuccessful firms and 
2 for successful firms. The debt to book value of assets ratio is not statistically 
significant to conclude that leverage characteristics are different for the sub-sample. 
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6.1. Market to book ratio 
The ratio of the market value of a firm's assets to its book value measures investment 
opportunities. Theoretically, firms that make net present value investments will have 
market values equal to their book values. Firms with market values greater than book 
values would be earning returns greater than their required returns and firms with 
market values less than book values would be earning returns less than their cost of 
capital. If book values for these latter firms were close to the liquidation value of 
assets, the owner of these assets would be better off financially if the company 
liquidated its assets. 
Sample results 
Table 15: Summary statistics for the market to book ratio for successful and 
unsuccessful firms . 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 23 24 
Mean 1.1 .5 
Median .66 .4 
Standard error .33 .1 
Standard deviation 1.6 .41 
Quartile Range 1.2 .5 
lower quartile .209 .19 
upper quartile 1.4 .7 
T stat -1.84252 
P value .071993 
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The mean value of market to book ratio is higher for successful firms than 
unsuccessful firms. The mean values are 1.1 and 0.05 respectively for successful and 
unsuccessful firms. The median values are 0.66 for successful firms and 0.4 for 
unsuccessful firms. The difference in mean is statistically significant at a p ratio of 
0.071993. The minimum value for unsuccessful firms is 0.021 and the maximum 7.1. 
There is greater variability of values in the mean book ratio with a lower quartile of 
0.209 and an upper quartile mean of 1.4. The distribution of book ratio is concentrated 
around the mean book ratio for unsuccessful firms. The minimum value is 0.008 and 
the maximum 2.0. The lower quartile is 0.19 and upper quartile is 0.7. The p value of 
0.071993 is statistically significant to conclude that successful firms represent firms 
with greater market opportunities because they may produce unique or specialised 
products. The market to book ratio is indicative of firms with growth options and 
discretionary investments that can be destroyed easily in an inefficient recontracting 
mechanism. 
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6.2. Total liabilities to total assets. 
Sample results 
Table 16: Summary statistics for the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for 
successful and unsuccessful firms 
1.2 · 
04" 
Count 
Mean 
Median 
Standard error 
Standard deviation 
Quartile Range 
Lower quartile 
Upper quartile 
T stat 
P value 
F1pe21 
Mean ol iMrlge 
Successful 
27 
.7 
.57 
.09 
.5 
.4 
.535 
.9 
-1.05664 
.295470 
Unsuccessful 
28 
.6 
.7 
.I 
.06 
.4 
.42 
.8 
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Analysis of the sample yields an important · factor about the capital structure. 
Successful firms are more highly leveraged than unsuccessful firms . The mean ratio is 
0. 70 for successful . firms and 0.60 for unsuccessful firms. The median value for 
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successful firms is 0.57 and 0. 70 for unsuccessful firms. It appears that while the 
mean value for successful firms is higher than that of unsuccessful firms, their median 
values are in reverse order. It is necessary to look at the distribution of values in the 
sample. The minimum debt ratio is 0.154 and the maximum is 2.3. Twenty five per 
cent of the sample has a debt ratio of 0.535 and seventy five per cent of the firms have 
an average debt ratio of 0.90. The unsuccessful firms have a minimum of 0.017 and a 
maximum of 1. The lower quartile represents firms with a debt ratio of 0.42 and the 
upper quartile with a debt ratio of 0.80. This shows a high variability of firm specific 
characteristics, as shown by figure 22. 
Summary of chapter 6. 
The study uses two different measures of financial leverage, the market to book ratio 
and debt to book value of assets. The study finds that successful firms are levered by 
the market to book ratio and debt to book value of assets. The difference in means for 
the market to book ratio for successful and unsuccessful firms is statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the theory linking the market to book ratio to 
a measure of investment opportunities that can be destroyed easily in an inefficient 
recontracting mechanism [Gilson et al (1990), Scheifler et al (1992)]. 
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Chapter 7 Financing of Assets Characteristics 
Introduction 
This section analyses how both groups of firms that restructure their claims at the 
Johannesburg Stock-Exchange finance their activities. Firms combine the use of long-
term and short-term financing, which helps firms to service their debt. If a firm was to 
invest all its funds in properties, for example, this may cause a liquidation of assets in 
a recession period. A firm that is badly affected in a recession may not be able to sell 
some of its assets to service its short-term debt because of the proportion of long-term 
debt overhang. If debt is not rescheduled the firm may be forced into liquidation. 
Furthermore, it cannot limit its abilities to finance short-term operations. 
Borrowed funds can be used to finance current operations (short-term) or may be 
invested in production facilities or fixed assets that generally last for a long period of 
time. A general feature in financing assets is that long-term or short-term borrowed 
funds can be secured or unsecured. All these features have different implications for 
firms that experience poor performance. 
The collateral features of a security have an impact in controlling the agency costs of 
debt, limiting the claim dilution, specialisation of assets, loan mari.rrity or minimising 
information asymm~tries between borrowers and lenders. 
Table 17 presents the financing of assets characteristics for the two groups of firms . 
These characteristics are the ratio of long-term, short-term and fixed assets 
respectively to total assets, the use of secured and unsecured debt 
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Table 17. : Sample assets financing characteristics for firms that restructured their 
claims successfully and were re-instated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and 
finns that were delisted after an unsuccessful debt restructuring. 
Successful firms Unsuccessful firms 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max p value 
Long term debt .2 .09 .019 .6 3 .2 .009 .259065 
Total assets 
Short term debt .4 .29 .011 2.0 .4 .4 .021 .928532 
Total assets 
Fixed assets .4561 .. 2990 .0023 .4530 .4245 .0543 .9865 .9740 
Total assets 
Secured debt 2145 990 16.334 7285 73648.8 6171 132 813333 .2251 
(000) 
Unsecured 76006.47 2000 14 505686.7 105058 11024 413 1255000 .7941 
(000) 
The mean and median of the ratio of long-term debt to total assets reveal that 
unsuccessful firms have more long-term debt than successful firms. The minimum 
value of long-term debt to total assets is 0.019 for successful firms and 0.009 for 
unsuccessful firms. The maximum value is 0.6 for successful and 1 for unsuccessful 
firms . The mean and median for unsuccessful firms are higher than those for 
successful firms but the difference in mean is not statistically significant. 
Successful and unsuccessful firms appear to have the same level of short-term and 
fixed assets finance. Their means are quite close but the medians of unsuccessful 
firms are greater than those successful firms. The minimum value of the short-term 
debt to total assets ratio is 0.011 for successful firms and 0.021 for unsuccessful firms. 
The maximum value of short-term debt to total assets ratio is 1 for unsuccessful firms 
and 2 for successful.firms. For the fixed assets to total debt ratio, the minimum value 
is 0.0023 for successful firms and 0.0543 for unsuccessful firms. The maximum fixed 
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assets to total debt ratio is 1 for successful firms and 0.9865 for unsuccessful firms. 
Both the results for the short-term debt to total assets and fixed assets to total assets 
ratios are not statistically significant, at a p level of 0.05, to conclude that there is a 
difference in the sub-sample. 
Unsuccessful firms appear to use more secured and unsecured debt in comparison to 
successful firms. Th~ir mean and median are higher than those of successful firms. As 
in the long-term-debt ratio, short-term-debt and fixed assets to total assets ratios, the 
study finds that these differences in assets financing are not statistically significant at a 
p level of 0.05 . 
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7.1. Long-term debt to total assets. 
Some debt choice theoretical models use maturity differences across the sources to 
generate predictions·. According to Brick and Ravid (1991 ), long term debt increases 
debt capacity. According to Diamond ( 1991 b) both firms with high credit quality and 
firms with low credit quality use short-term debt; medium quality firms use long-term 
debt. Other models predict that firms with high asset liquidation values will show a 
higher preference for short-term debt [Houston and Venkataraman (1994)]. 
Sample results 
Table 18: Summary statistics for the ratio of long-term debt to total assets for 
successful and unsuccessful firms . 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 19 18 
Mean .2 .3 
Median .09 .2 
Standard error .05 .05 
Standard deviation .2 .21 
Quartile Range .2 .3 
Lower quartile .028 .09 
Upper quartile .2 .4 
T stat 1.14724 
P value .259065 
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Financing of Assets Characteristics 
From Table 18, it appears that unsuccessful firms use more long-term debt than 
successful firms. The mean proportion of long term debt in assets financing is 0.3 for 
unsuccessful firms and 0.2 for successful firms. This proportion increases when 
analysing the differences in median and other dispersion measures. The median 
proportion for the use of long-term debt is 0.2 for unsuccessful firms and 0.09 for 
successful firms. The lower quartile is 0.09 for unsuccessful firms and 0.028 for 
successful firms. The upper quartile is 0.4 for unsuccessful firms and 0.2 for 
successful firms. The difference in mean is not statistically significant at a p level of 
0.05 . As a consequence, the study can not conclude that unsuccessful firms, with 
higher mean and median values of long-term debt compared to those of successful 
firms, constitute a sample of medium-quality firms as suggested by Diamond (199lb). 
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7.2. Short-term debt to total assets 
Sample results 
Table 19: Summary statistics for short-term to total assets ratio for successful and 
unsuccessful firms. 
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The mean for short-term assets financing is equal at 0.4 for successful and 
unsuccessful firms . The difference in median shows that unsuccessful firms finance 
their assets with short-term debt more than do their successful counterparts. The 
median proportion of short-term financing is 0.4 for unsuccessful firms and 0.29 for 
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successful firms . The lower quartile is 0.16 for unsuccessful firms and 0.046 for 
successful firms. The upper quartile is 0.6 for both successful and unsuccessful firms. 
The difference in mean is not statistically significant at a p level of 0.05 to conclude 
that successful firms, with a higher market to book ratio (see section 6.1 ), have a 
preference for short-term debt, as suggested by Houston and Venkataraman (1994). 
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7 .3 Fixed assets to total assets. 
Sample results 
Table 20: Summary statistics for fixed assets to total assets ratio for successful and 
unsuccessful firms. 
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Table 20 shows that successful and unsuccessful firms use the same level of fixed 
assets to total assets but the median for successful firms is lower compared to that of 
unsuccessful firms. The quartile range is higher for successful firms, as shown by 
figure 28. The quartile value is 0.8151 for successful firms and 0.29 for unsuccessful 
firms. The lower quartile is 0.1215 for successful firms and 0.256 for unsuccessful 
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firms. The upper quartile is 0.9366 for successful firms and 0.546 for unsuccessful 
firms. The difference in mean is not statistically significant, at a p level of 0.05, to 
give any indication of difference in financing of assets in the sub-sample. 
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7 .4. Secured and on.secured debt 
Existing theories claim that secured debt lowers net borrowing cost by reducing 
agency costs, limiting claim dilution, or minimising information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. Some models link security of debt to size of the firm, 
specialisation of assets, time to maturity and loan size. 
Scott (1977) has formally demonstrated that the value of secured debt rises as the 
possibility of defaul~ increases. Thus, he argues that firms with a high probability of 
bankruptcy will find that the benefits of secured debt outweigh the costs, while firms 
with a low probability of bankruptcy will find that the costs outweigh the benefits. An 
agency cost explanation of collateral is that the factors increasing the likelihood of 
non-payment, such as relatively inexperienced management, high leverage, great 
business risk, long time to maturity, or depressed economic conditions, should 
likewise be associated with the use of secured debt. 
During a bankruptcy proceeding, a court can prevent bondholders from taking 
possession of assigned property in reorganisation proceedings if collateral is judged 
necessary for the continued operations of the firm [Warner (1977) and Smith and 
Warner (1979b)]. Bondholders must anticipate selling assets easily at bankruptcy for 
borrowers to use c~llateral to bond against claim dilution or to reduce expected 
foreclosure costs. Since liquidation assures that secured creditors will receive title to 
the pledged assets, companies more likely to be liquidated in bankruptcy should offer 
more collateral more frequently than companies less likely to be liquidated. Smith and 
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Warner (1979a) argue that a smaller firm has a greater chance of liquidation than a 
larger firm, smaller firms should therefore use secured debt more frequently. 
Chan and Kanatas (1985) also predict that newer and smaller companies will offer 
collateral more frequently than other types of firms. Collateral is a more valuable 
signal of project quality when lenders have less information concerning a firm ' s 
operations. Similarly, collateral may reduce debt expenses more greatly for small 
companies because of their higher probability of bankruptcy [Altman, Haldeman, and 
Narayanan (1977)] . 
When assets are highly specialised, their value to the firm is higher than their value to 
the market place. The high cost of selling these assets reduces management' s 
economic incentives to substitute high-risk projects. Since asset specificity reduces 
creditor concerns with asset substitution, it lowers the value of bonding against this 
type of opportunistic behaviour. Additionally, borrowers cannot dramatically reduce 
lenders ' expected foreclosure costs by pledging assets that have a much lower value if 
sold to the next highest bidder [Leeth and Scott (1979) and Stultz and Johnson 
( 1985)]. Various theories predict that the companies with more specialised assets 
should offer security less frequently than other companies. Therefore, the variation in 
asset specificity and marketability among industries should cause a corresponding 
variation in the use of secured debt. 
Creditors can attempt to prevent opportunistic behaviour either by monitoring the 
actions of the borrowers or by punishing misbehaving borrowers ex post and by 
increasing interest rates on future loans. Firms considering substituting high-risk 
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projects realise that the wealth transfer on short-term debt is relatively small, whereas 
the reputation cost (higher future interest rates) is relatively large. Because short-term 
debt minimises the incentive for asset substitution, the benefit to the firm of bonding 
against this type of behaviour is correspondingly small. Consequently, short-term 
creditors will rely heavily on the relatively cheap reputation effect, while long-term 
creditors will rely on more expensive bonding mechanisms such as collateral 
provisions [Schwartz ( 1981 )]. 
Even in the absence of reputation effect, firms should secure long-term debt more 
frequently than short-term debt because of the direct costs f assets substitution 
[Jackson and Kronman (1979)]. With long-term debt, borrowers can gradually and 
economically alter projects in subtle ways that impair creditors' position. With short-
term debt, however, the speed required to substitute assets raises costs sufficiently to 
prevent this type of opportunistic behaviour. 
Finally loan maturity may increase the pledging of collateral because of the higher 
probability of default on long-term debts. During each time period, the company faces 
some probability of an adverse event precipitating bankruptcy. As the number of loan 
periods increases, the probability that at least one event will cause the company to 
default likewise increases. Because default risk raises the value of secured lending, 
long-term debt should be more frequently unsecured than short-term debt. 
In contrast, Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that a company should secure short-term 
debt more frequently than long-term debt. Assuming that new debt will have the same 
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maturity as existing unsecured debt, they demonstrate that the value of a security 
provision is a decreasing function oftime to maturity. 
As loan size increases, per unit monitoring and administrative expenses fall , making 
secured debt more economical. Therefore, holding everything constant, larger loans 
should be more frequently secured than smaller loans [Jackson and Kronman (1979)]. 
Loan size may also increase the use of collateral because of the impact on leverage. 
Loan size increases the debt to value ratio of the firm if the loan replaces equity or 
serves as the sole source of financing for a new project. With either assumption, an 
increase in loan size should raise the likelihood of secured lending by increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy. Larger companies have a lower probability of liquidation at 
bankruptcy and consequently should offer collateral less frequently than smaller 
compames. 
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7.4.1. Secured debt 
Sample results 
Table 21: Summary statistics for short-term secured debt for successful and 
unsuccessful firms (in thousands of Rands). 
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Table 21 shows that successful firms use less secured debt than their unsuccessful 
counterparts. The mean of secured debt for successful firms is 2145 while it is 
73648.8 for unsuccessful firms. However, the extent of the use of secured debt for 
unsuccessful firms decreases when the differences in median are analysed. It appears 
that the median value of secured debt for unsuccessful firms is relatively low with a 
112 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n 
Chapter 7 Financing of Assets Characteristics 
median value of 6171. The median value decreases slightly for successful firms with a 
value of 990. This result suggests that the value of the mean for unsuccessful firms 
may be influenced by upward outliers as shown by figure 30. The lower quartile value 
is 136 for successful firms and the upper quartile 4140. The lower quartile for 
unsuccessful firms is 2614 and the upper quartile 15544.5. 
Some observation need to be noted. The use of secured debt may be related to size and 
as a consequence, large, unsuccessful firms may use more collateral than smaller, 
successful firms (see section 5.1). In addition, as suggested by Scott (1977), large, 
unsuccessful firms µiay use more collateral as the probability of default increases. 
This is in contradiction to the argument of Smith and Warner (1979a) that smaller 
firms should use more secured debt because of their greater chance of liquidation of 
assets . This applies also to the prediction of Chan and Kanatas (1985) that newer and 
smaller firms should use collateral more frequently than other types of firms. 
However, it appears that successful firms, with a higher market to book ratio, as 
indicated in section 6.1 , offer less collateral, as suggested by Scott (1977) and Stulz 
and Johnson (1985). Results contained in Table 21 are not statistically significant at a 
p level of 0.05 to conclude that any of the theoretical implications apply to the sub-
sample. 
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7.4.2. Unsecured debt 
Sample results 
Table 22: Summary statistics for the use of unsecured debt for successful and 
unsuccessful firms (in thousands of Rands). 
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From Table 22, it appears that successful firms rely heavily on financing with 
unsecured debt, in comparison with secured debt. The mean for the use of unsecured 
debt for successful firms is 76006.47 and for unsuccessful firms the mean is 105058.5. 
The value for unsecured financing drops when the median value for successful and 
unsuccessful firms is compared. The median value is 2000 for successful firms and 
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11024 for unsuccessful firms. The lower quartile is 619 for successful firms and 
1674.333 for unsuccessful firms. The upper quartile is 10962 for successful firms and 
26778.5 for unsuccessful firms . The results in Table 22 suggests that the difference in 
mean is not statistically significant at a p level of .05 to conclude any difference in the 
use of unsecured debt for the sub-sample. 
Summary of chapter 7. 
The choice of assets financing policy plays an important role in debt service obligation 
for failing firms in case of liquidation of assets. The study finds that successful firms 
may constitute a sample of medium firm quality, as suggested by Diamond (1991b). 
Houston and Venkataraman (1994) predict that firms with a higher market to book 
ratio use more short-term debt. However the study finds that both successful and 
unsuccessful firms use the same level of short-term debt. They also have the same 
patterns in fixed assets financing. 
Assets financed with secured debt can reduce the agency cost of debt, limit claim 
dilution or minimise information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. The 
study finds that unsuccessful firms use more secured debt, as suggested by Scott 
(1977). This is because firms that are likely to liquidate use more collateral. 
Conversely, the study finds that small, successful firms use less collateral. The results 
are also consistent \Yith the models of Leeth and Scott (1979) and Stulz and Johnson 
(1985) on assets substitution problem, which suggest that firms with lower market to 
book ratio should offer more collateral. The results are consistent with the monitoring 
hypothesis of Schwartz ( 1981) and reputation effects hypothesis of Jackson and 
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Kronman (1979). However, the results are in contradiction of the predictions of Smith 
and W amer ( 1979a,b) and W amer ( 1977) on agency cost. The results are also in 
contradiction of the asymmetric information hypothesis of Chan and Kanatas (1985) 
and Altman, Haldeman and Naranayan (1977). 
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Chapter 8 Debt Maturity Characteristics 
Introduction 
Different theoretical models link the maturity of debt to liquidity and screening, 
agency costs of debt .and asymmetric information. 
a) Liquidity risk and screening: The risk of not being able to refund debt because of 
deterioration in financial or economic conditions can motivate firms to lengthen the 
maturity of their debt. According to Sharpe (1991), Diamond (1991a) and Titman 
( 1992) bad news ab.out a borrower may arrive at the refinancing of a debt, causing 
investors not to extend credit or to raise the default premium on new debt. Diamond 
refers to liquidity risk as the risk of a borrower being forced into inefficient 
liquidation because refinancing is not available. Even if this extreme outcome is not 
realised, short-term debt can cause a loss of project rents if it has to be refinanced at 
an overly high interest rate b cause of credit market imperfection [Froot, Scharfstein, 
and Stein (1993)]. Firms may also experience dead-weight indirect costs of financial 
distress, for example a loss of customers and distraction of management, when they 
lose access to attractively priced credit. 
b) Agency costs of debt: Myers (1977) argues that short-term debt reduces the 
potential for underinvestment caused by debt overhang because lenders and borrowers 
recontract before growth options are exercised. Bamea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) 
take the position that short-term debt reduces the incentive for risky asset substitution 
because short-term bond prices are insensitive to shifts in risk of the underlying assets. 
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This view of debt maturity, called the agency costs or contracting costs perspective, 
suggests that firms whose value derives to a larger extent from investment 
opportunities that are particularly sensitive to the degree of management effort and 
talent have an incentive to borrow short-term. Another view is that debt maturity 
choice can reduce agency costs between managers and equityholders. Long-term debt 
is almost always junior to short-term debt. Hart and Moore (1995) show that a firm 
can select an optimal amount of junior and senior debt to offset management incentive 
to invest in unprofitable projects. 
c) Asymmetric information: In signalling models, investors infer private information 
held by borrowers from the debt maturity choice. Because short-term debt is less 
sensitive to underpricing, firms that have underpriced liabilities choose to issue debt 
of a shorter term to maturity and vice versa for firms with overpriced liabilities. In 
adverse selection models, private information is not revealed, and maturity is chosen 
to minimise the effect of private information on financing costs. The key insight of 
adverse selection models is that asymmetric information induces a bias towards short-
term debt. 
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Table 23 . : Maturity of debt for firms that restructured their claims successfully at the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and were re-instated and firms that were delisted after 
an unsuccessful debt restructuring. 
Successful firms Unsuccessful firms. 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max p ratio 
Long .274 .1904 .0034 .9288 .3817 .3730 .0170 .9076 .169093 
term debt 
Short .671 .823 .03334 1.089 .643 .621 .0921 1.2793 .335639 
term debt 
It appears from table 23 that successful firms are highly levered on a short-term basis 
with a mean ratio of 0.670 and the median value of 0.823 while unsuccessful firms 
have a mean of 0.643 and a median of .621. The difference in mean for the long-term 
debt indicates that the mean value for successful firms is 0.2734 and a median of 
0.1904 and for unsuccessful firm the mean value is 0.3817 and 0.373 as a median 
value. The difference in means for the long-term debt maturity indicates that 
unsuccessful firms are highly levered on the long-term debt maturity, and their means 
and medians are higher than those of successful firms. However, this difference in 
mean is not statistically significant at a p level of 0.05. 
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8.1. Long-term debt maturity 
Sample results. 
Table 24: Summary statistics of long-term debt maturity for successful and 
unsuccessful firms . 
Successful 
Count 26 
Mean .273963 
Median .19398 
Standard error .052033 
Standard deviation .265319 
Quartile Range .334532 
Lower quartile .059177 
Upper quartile .393709 
T stat 1.396605 
P value .169093 
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The long-term maturity of debt is higher for unsuccessful fimis than for successful 
firms . Results from Table 24 suggests that 38.2% of debt matures over a period of 
more than one year . for unsuccessful firms and the median value of long-term debt 
maturity is 37.3 %. 25% of unsuccessful firms have a long-term debt maturity of 
15 .97% while 75% of unsuccessful firms have a long-term debt maturity of 33.77%. 
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Successful firms have a Jong-term debt maturity of 27.4%, and 50% of successful 
firms having a long-term debt maturity of 19.04%. Analysis of dispersion shows that 
25% of successful firms have a Jong-term debt of 5.92% and 75% of them have a 
Jong-term debt of 39.37%. The difference in means is not statistically significant to 
conclude that there is a difference in servicing the long-term debt maturity of the sub-
sample even if the mean and median of Jong-term debt maturity of unsuccessful firms 
is higher than the long-term obligations of successful firms. 
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8.2. Short-term debt maturity 
Diamond (1993) finds that the seniority and maturity of debt differs. Short-term debt 
tends to be senior, and long-term debt allows additional debt to dilute its value. 
Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. This model predicts that 
a greater proportion of short-term debt provide short-term lenders the incentives to 
remove the borrower from control or replacing the borrower with another manager. 
Asquith, Gertner and Scharstein (1991) provide some empirical support to Diamond' s 
model. They find that generally short-term lenders do not make debt concessions 
outside the bankruptcy court when there is senior long-term debt in place. They also 
found that short-term lenders who delay defaults do so by diluting the value of junior 
claims. In a case study Baldwin, Mason and Hughes (1983) showed that high levels of 
short-term debt forced Massey Ferguson to quickly renegotiate a debt restructuring 
agreement with its creditors. The debt restructuring was followed by a sell of assets, 
employee layoffs and a discontinuance of operations. 
Sample results 
Table 25: Summary statistics of short-term debt maturity for successful and 
unsuccessful firms. 
Successful Unsuccessful 
Count 27 26 
Mean .670954 .642752 
Median .822533 .620641 
Standard error .065742 .053069 
Standard deviation .341604 .270598 
Quartile Range .543747 .364269 
Lower quartile .420643 .484657 
Upper quartile .964390 .848926 
T stat -.332327 
P value .741004 
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Results in Table 25 suggest that successful firms have a higher mean and median of 
short-term debt maturity compared to unsuccessful firms. The mean value of short-
term debt maturity is 67.1 % and that 50% of successful firms have to pay 82,25% of 
their debt in a period of less than one year. Other measures of dispersion reveal that 
25% of successful firms have a short-term debt maturity of 42.06% and 75% of them 
have a short-term debt maturity of 96.44%. Unsuccessful firms have a mean value of 
their short-term debt maturity at 64.28%. The measures of dispersion reveal that 25% 
of firms have a short-term debt obligations of 48.46%, 50% of unsuccessful firms 
have a median value of 62.06% of their short-term debt maturity and finally that 75% 
of unsuccessful firms have a short-term debt maturity of 84.89%. Successful firms 
present higher mean and median values for short-term debt than unsuccessful firms, 
but as in the case of long-term debt the difference in means is not statistically 
significant to conclude that there is a difference in the sub-sample debt service. 
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Summary of chapter 8. 
Theoretical models link debt maturity to liquidity risk and screening, agency costs and 
asymmetric information. Liquidity risk may force a firm into inefficient liquidation 
because refinancing is not available. Results in chapter 5 (section 5.2.1) suggest that 
successful firms have more liquidity than unsuccessful firms. This is consistent with 
the suggestion of Bamea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) that firms with more investment 
opportunities have an incentive to have more short-term debt. 
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Chapter 9 Ownership Structure Characteristics 
Introduction 
Several empirical studies report a change in ownership structure when a firm 
experiences poor performance or default on its debt [Gilson (1989, 1990), Cannella, 
Donald and Scott (1994)]. These studies follow the suggestion of Jensen (1989a,b) 
that leverage may be an important determinant on how decision rights in the firm are 
allocated among the claimholders. Because the impact of leverage or default on the 
allocation of these r~ghts is not well understood, much of this section is devoted to an 
analysis of the changes in ownership structure between directors' and minority 
interests. 
As suggested by Fama (1980), the viability of a large firm with diffuse ownership 
structure comes primarily from the disciplining force of managerial labour markets, 
both within and outside the firm. In the case of failing firms, Sutton and Callahan 
(1987) find that the stigma of bankruptcy threatens the career of any manager 
affiliated with such a firm. Several studies contend that the human capital of managers 
plummets in value when their firms experience extreme difficulties, regardless of their 
personal involvement. 
Gilson (1989,1990). and Houston and James (1993) detect severe external labour 
market consequence for managers whose firms become financially distressed. Gilson 
(1989) finds that 52% of sampled firms experience management turnover when the 
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firms default on their debt, go bankrupt or privately restructure to avoid bankruptcy. A 
significant number of changes are initiated by firm's bank lenders. Following their 
resignation from these firms, managers are not subsequently employed by another 
exchange-listed firm for at least three years. Gilson (1990) identifies that, on average, 
only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or debt restructuring ends. 
Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards following their 
departure. Common stock ownership becomes more concentrated, with large 
blockholders and less corporate insiders. Few firms are acquired. The results suggest 
that corporate default lead to significant changes in the ownership of firm's residual 
claims and in the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources. Houston and 
James (1993) corroborate Gilson's evidence by examining the relation between poor 
performance and CEO turnover in the commercial banking industry. Less than one 
third of the CEO's in their sample of financially distressed banks retained their jobs 
and only one out of 39 displaced CEOs acquired a similar post with another exchange-
listed bank. They conclude that management-borne costs of poor performance in the 
banking industry are at least as great as those of other industries. 
The disciplining force of the managerial labour market may come effectively from 
internal labour market. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Klein and Rosenfeld (1988), 
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), and Weisbach (1988) all provide evidence 
consistent with effective internal labour markets by examining firm-specific 
circumstances that lead to managerial turnover. Blackwell, Brickley, and Weisbach 
(1994) provide evidence of a well-functioning internal labour market by showing that 
sub-unit performance measures are closely linked to internal promotions and turnover 
decisions. By ranking subsidiary banks within holding companies according to their 
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relative performance of return on assets, they show that the probability of turnover and 
demotion is much greater for managers from underperforming subsidiaries. In 
addition, the probability of internal promotion is much greater for managers from 
subsidiaries with high relative performance. 
Table 26: Ownership structure between directors and minority interests for firms that 
successfully restructured their debt at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and were re-
instated and firms that delisted after an unsuccessful debt restructuring (in thousands 
ofrands). 
Successful firms Unsuccessful firms 
Year I Year2 Year3 Yearl Year2 Year3 
Directors ' Mean 44552 .83 40440.81 65392.38 95476.52 98963 .7 108090.9 
interests 
Median (8076) (11931) (14435) (30412) (50654) (38164) 
Minority Mean 20718 .67 20694.5 22629.33 17676.45 168541.9 7373.75 
interests 
Median (0.00) (0.00) (185) (7906) (10000) (162:)) 
Results from Table . 26 suggest that directors' and minority interests of successful 
firms are lower than those of their unsuccessful counterparts. The low level of 
directors ' and minority interests may be related to size' as shown in section 5.1. The 
second observation is that the means directors' and minority interests in successful 
decrease in pre-distress year (Year 2) and regain substantially in distress year. This is 
not the case for unsuccessful firms, where directors ' interests increase slowly from the 
first year to the distress year and the minority interests increase eight times in pre-
distress year to decrease 22 times in the distress year. 
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9.1. Directors' interests 
9.1.1. Directors' interests from the pre-base year (year 1) to the base year 
(year 2). 
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Results in Table 26 show that the directors' interests for successful firms decreased by 
0.92% in the base year from 44552.83 to 40440.81 at the same time the median 
interests of directors increases by 4 7. 7% form 8076 to 11931. The mean of directors ' 
interests of unsuccessful firms increased by 3.66% from 95476.52 to 98963.7 and 
their median by 66.6% from 30412 to 50654 in the pre-distress year. 
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9.1.2. Directors' interests from the base year (year 2) to the distress year (year 3). 
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Results in Table 26 show that the mean of directors' interests increased by 61.7% 
from 40440.81 in the pre-distress year to 65392.38 in the distress year. The median 
interests of directors increased in the same period by 20.98% from 11931 in the base 
year to 14435 in the distress year. In the same period, the mean of directors' interests 
for unsuccessful firrns increased by 9 .22% from 98963. 7 in the base year to 108090. 9 
in the distress year. Their median interests decreased by 24.47 % from the pre-distress 
year to the distress year. 
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9.1.3. Directors' interests from the pre-base year (year 1) to the distress year 
(year 3). 
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Results form Table 26 show that the directors ' mean and median interests increased 
on the onset of financial distress. Successful firms have a high increase in directors' 
interests, the mean of directors interests increased by 46.8% from 44552.8 in pre-base 
year to 65392.8 in the distress year. The median of directors interests increased by 
78.7% from 8076 in the pre-base year to 14435 in the distress year. Unsuccessful 
firms directors interests increased for the same period from 95476.52 in the pre-base 
year to 108090.9 in the distress year, this represents an increase of 13.2% in their 
mean. The median of directors' interests increased from 30412 in the pre-base year to 
38614 in the distress .year, which represents an increase of25.49 % for the period. 
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9.2. Minority interests 
9.2.1. Minority interests from the pre base year (year 1) to the base year (year 2) 
~n of mnriy nerests n ~ar I 
2-BeS -- -- - --
1.ieS 
From Table 26, the minority interests for successful firms decreased by 1.16 % from 
the pre-base year to the base year and in absolute amount, their mean decreasing from 
20718.67 to 22629.33 . The median of minority interests did not change from zero, 
which means that only 50% of uccessful firms did have meaningful minority 
interests. Over the same period, the mean of minority interests for unsuccessful firms 
increased from 17676.45 in the pre-base year to 168541.9 in the base year, which 
represents an impressive increase by 8.5 times their initial interests. The median of 
minority interests increased by 26.49 % from 7906 in the pre-base year to 10000 in the 
base year. 
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9.2.2. Minority interests from the base year (year 2) to the distress year (year 3) 
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The minority interests of unsuccessful firms, although increasing by 8.5 times in the 
base year, decreased from that period to the distress year by 19 times the pre-distress 
level , that is from 168541.9 to 7373.75. Even the median interests of minorities 
decreased by six times the pre-distress level, from 10000 in the base year to 1625 in 
the distress year. During the same period, minority interests for successful firms 
increased by 9.35% from 20694.5 in the base year to 22629.33 in the distress year. At 
the same time, the median of minority interests increased and was greater than zero. 
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9.2.3 Minority intel_"ests from pre-base year (year 1) to the distress year (year 3) 
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Results from Table 26 show an overall increase of minority interests for successful 
firms over the period, even though there was a decrease of 1.16% from year 1 to year 
2. The increase from year 2 to year 3 is 9.35%, so that the increase in minority 
interests was 9.22% for the period of year I to year 3. The increase in the median of 
minority interests for successful firms is positive, from 0 in year 1 and year 2 to 185 in 
year 3. During the same period the interests of minorities decreased for unsuccessful 
firms by 58.3% from 17676.45 in year 1 to 7373.75 in year 3. The same applies to the 
median of minority interests for unsuccessful firms, which experience a drop of 79.46 
% from 7906 in year 1 to 1625 in year 3. 
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Summary of chapter 9. 
This chapter analyses the change in ownership structure on the onset of financial 
failure. The study finds that during the distress period, the ownership interests of both 
insiders and outsiders increased for successful firms. For the same period, the study 
observes a small increase in insiders' ownership interests for unsuccessful firms, 
while outsiders' ownership decreased dramatically. This decrease can be interpreted as 
a loss of confidence in the viability of these economic entities. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion I 
Introduction 
The study analyses the incentives and mechanisms that govern corporate restructuring 
activities for a sample of failing firms that experienced poor performance and a 
decline in value on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange between 1986 and 1996. 
The study attempts to analyse the hypothesis on the mechanisms to resolve corporate 
failure on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The original hypothesis states that firms 
with a higher market value/ replacement cost will be more likely to recontract their 
financial claims privately and preserve the going-concern value in assets sales and 
premature liquidations than firms with a lower Tobin's q. 
Formally stated, the null hypothesis is: 
Ho: There is no difference in the resolution of failing companies. 
The following supplementary hypotheses attempt to analyse the patterns for 
reorganisation of failing firms. 
h 1: Larger firms compared by their book value of assets are likely to recontract easily 
because the larger the firm the lower its probability ofliquidation. 
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h2: Firms that experience a substantial decline in cash flow performance and liquidity 
are likely to take actions that generate short-term cash flow. They also likely to 
recontract quickly to preserve their going concern value 
h3: Firms that are highly levered are likely to recontract their claims because leverage 
acts as a catalyst for organisational change. 
h4: Firms that are likely to recontract their claims are firms that invest, short-term, 
more fixed assets that can be pledged in a liquidation, and using more collateral, thus 
reducing the likelihood of liquidation. 
h5: Firm that are likely to restructure their claims are likely to have more short-term 
debt that matures in Jess than year because short-term debt acts as an overhang. 
h6: Firms that are likely to restructure easily are given a going-concern certificate by 
an increase in ownership structure of inside and outside claims. 
The empirical study finds that successful firms that were delisted and re-instated on 
the stock exchange have a higher and statistically significant market replacement cost 
ratio, less bank debt and fewer creditors. The implication of these results is that South 
African corporate restructuring activities rely more on assets characteristics than 
financial characteristics. 
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10.1. Assets characteristics 
The study finds that failing firms with relatively high going-concern value measured 
by the ratio of market replacement cost, are more likely to restructure their financial 
claims and be re-instated on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This is because more 
of this going-concern value can be lost when the debt and the firm's operations are 
reorganised outside the mechanisms of the market that constitutes the stock exchange. 
The result is consistent with the argument of Jensen (l 989a,b) that highly leveraged 
firms will default sooner if they are mismanaged. Firms with a high going-concern 
value are likely to restructure easily. Default in this case has the virtue of forcing the 
finn ' s investors to undertake corrective changes in corporate policy, thus preserving 
more of the firm 's going-concern value. 
10.2. Financial characteristics 
The hypothesis on financial characteristics developed in chapter 3 suggests that firms 
with more bank debt and fewer creditors are likely to restructure their financial claims 
easily because more bank debt and fewer creditors reduce the amount of information 
asymmetry and holdout problems between stockholders and creditors. 
The empirical results of this study suggest that firms that restructured their claims 
successfully had less bank debt than unsuccessful firms. This result in not in 
contradiction with the prediction developed in chapter 3, where more bank debt 
reduces the information asymmetry and holdout problems. A possible explanation of 
this result is that in South Africa corporate contractual relationships are dominated by 
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pyramids and multi-tiered groupmgs with strong ties to institutional lenders. In 
addition, the legal . and regulatory environment does not impose restrictions on 
institutional lenders from holding equity and debt in the firm 's financial structure. 
This particular ownership structure gives outsiders the legal authority to watch over 
their capital more effectively, as argued by Jensen (l 989a,b ). The South African 
contractual relationship structure can lessen the free-rider problem and information 
asymmetry that are associated with corporate restructuring activities. 
The study also finds that firms that restructured successfully had fewer creditors, by 
both mean and median. This result is consistent with the theory that suggests that 
where firms have fewer creditors, these creditors have stronger incentives to monitor 
the fim1 's activities. An effective monitoring mechanisms of the firm 's activities by 
creditors has the benefit of reducing the information asymmetry and free-rider 
problems. 
10.3. Additional tests 
Additional tests investigate different patterns that may arise to differentiate between 
firms that successfully restructured their claims and firms that were delisted from the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange after an unsuccessful debt restructuring, between 1986 
and 1996. 
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10.3.1. Controlling for size 
The additional test finds that unsuccessful firms have statistically significant higher 
size as measured by the mean and median of the book value of assets. The implication 
of this result is that firms that successfully restructure their claims on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange tend to smaller in size than unsuccessful firms. This 
result is consistent with the argument of Weiss (1990) that size is correlated with 
bargaining complexity. Larger size implies that, on average, more parties are involved 
in negotiations, making it more difficult for creditors to form workable coalitions 
resulting in larger equity deviations. 
10.3.2. Controlling for liquidity and performance 
Firms that restructured their claims successfully have higher mean and median cash 
flow liquidity measured by the current ratio. Results of cash flow performance 
measured by the average ratio of Ebit to total assets suggest that successful firms 
performed better than unsuccessful firms. However, analysis, year by year, of cash 
flow performance of the ratio of Ebit to total assets reveals that successful firms 
performed better in base year, but their cash flow performance deteriorated on the 
onset of financial failure, at the time when · cash flow performance improved slightly 
for unsuccessful fin:ns. This result is consistent with the argument of Jensen (1989) 
that firms experiencing a substantial decline in cash flow performance react quickly to 
preserve their going-concern value. 
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10.3.3. Controlling for leverage 
Leverage as measured by the market to book ratio is marginally higher and statistically 
significant for successful firms . This result may be influenced by the higher market 
value of successful firms . Leverage as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets shows that successful firms have a higher mean value and a lower median 
value. Each ratio may contain some measurement error in the sense that management 
may refer to some other ratio or variable when setting the firm's debt level. However, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that there is no reason to expect either of the two 
ratios to be a biased estimate of the true leverage ratio. 
10.3.4. Controlling for financing of assets 
The ratio of long-term debt to total assets is higher by the mean and the median for 
unsuccessful firm s. Both successful and unsuccessful firms have the same level of 
mean for the ratios of short-term debt and fixed assets financing. The median values 
of short-term debt and fixed assets ratios are lower for successful firms. 
10.3.S. Controlling for debt maturity 
An additional test on controlling for debt maturity shows that unsuccessful firms have 
higher mean and median values of long-term debt than successful firms . The · mean 
and median for short-term debt are for successful firms. This result is consistent with 
the empirical result of Baldwin, Mason and Hughes (1983) that suggests that high 
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levels of short-term debt forced Massey Ferguson to quickly renegotiate a debt 
restructuring with its creditors. 
10.3.6. Controlling for ownership structure 
The study finds that directors' interests increased on the onset of financial failure for 
both successful and unsuccessful firms. The increase in directors' interests is very 
substantial for succ~ssful firms. During the same period, the interests of minority 
shareholders decreased substantially for unsuccessful firms. For successful the 
interests of minority shareholders increased substantially by their mean and median 
for the period. 
10.4. Conclusion 
The empirical results suggest that the incentives and mechanisms of the South African 
restructuring activities rely more on assets characteristics .rather than financial 
characteristics. These findings are consistent with the agency theory of debt for these 
reasons: 
1. As argued by Jensen (1989a,b) highly levered firms default sooner if they are 
mismanaged. Firms with relatively high going-concern value are more likely to 
restructure easily and privately. Default, in this case, has the ·virtue of forcing the 
firm's investors to undertake corrective changes in corporate policy, thus preserving 
the firm's going-concern value. 
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2. The South African legal and regulatory environment has produced a particular 
contractual relationship where shareholders act as principal and agent [Gerson, Barr 
and Kantor (1985)] : This particular ownership structure may give equityholders few 
incentives to engage in wealth transfer policies. Jensen (1976) and Myers (1977) argue 
in their risk/ return notion that equityholders acting as agents may have little incentive 
to appropriate wealth from debtholders by making sub-optimal investment decisions 
that compromise debtholders interests. Sub-optimal investment decisions produce two 
effects. One is the transfer of wealth from debtholders to equityholders. The second is 
the decline in value of the firm, which may lead to default due to the cost associated 
with the sub-optimal nature of such investments. Debtholders who are aware of these 
incentives will require a higher return on their debt. Unsuccessful firms are more 
susceptible to this problem of opportunistic behaviour by debtholders. 
These results suggest that the nature of the restructuring of failing firms is influenced 
by the distribution of claims among the firm 's investors. The alignment of managers' 
and shareholders ' interests, and the absence of restriction of institutional lenders from 
holding equity and debt in South Africa may lessen the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers and debtholders and shareholders, thus creating an 
incentive for investors to monitor actively the firm in which they invest. 
10.5. Suggestions for future research 
While the findings of the study provide evidence on the importance of assets and 
financial characteristics in resolving corporate failure for listed companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, they also raises some questions. Larger companies 
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have a lower liquidation value at bankruptcy but the findings of the study suggest that 
smaller firms restructure their claims more successfully. What is the relationship 
between size, assets characteristics and the nature of the external claims used for 
financing? Theoretical work in this area is not extensive and further work is needed. 
The difference in debt maturity suggest that firms that restructure their claims have 
high short-term debt (that matures in less than a year). The question is how these firms 
respond to poor performance and a decline in value. Typical responses include assets 
restructuring, employee layoffs and management replacement. How and why delisted 
firms choose certain responses over others remains largely unexplored. The change in 
ownership structure characteristics suggests that in both case directors' interests 
increase while minority interests decrease for unsuccessful firms. The fact that many 
South African companies have a controlling shareholder is important here. What is the 
effect of such ownership claims on the restructuring process? These questions 
represent some useful areas for future research designed to gain a better understanding 
of the issues involved. 
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